LAWS(PVC)-1934-11-34

HIS HOLINESS SRI VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEEYAR SWAMIGAL, HEAD OF THEVANAMAMALAI MUTT (DECEASED) Vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS

Decided On November 07, 1934
HIS HOLINESS SRI VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEEYAR SWAMIGAL, HEAD OF THEVANAMAMALAI MUTT (DECEASED) Appellant
V/S
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a judgment of Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., dismissing the plaintiff's suit in limine. The plaintiff is, it is alleged in the plaint, the head of an ancient and important religious mutt known as the "Vanamatnalai Mutt" at Nanguneri, and entitled to certain special honours, privileges and emoluments in the Athinatha Alwar temple at Alwarthirunagari in preference to other persons in the temple entitled to receive similar honours. It is alleged in the plaint that the High Court has in a former litigation held that the first thirtham is to be given after the Archakas to the plaintiff, the Sanyasi Jeeyar of Vanamamalai Mutt, whenever he attends during the Vaikasi festival, etc., and that the plaintiff and his predecessors have been enjoying these honours from time immemorial in accordance with the ancient usage of the institution and in particular during the last three days of the Vaikasi festival with the "Aravanai" honours of the previous night and similar honours. The first defendants are the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras. It is conceded by the plaintiff-appellant that the honours in question are not connected with an office and also that the honours claimed could not be the subject of a claim in a civil suit. It is further alleged in the plaint that certain persons who claimed to be the worshippers of the temple applied to the first defendants to declare the right to honours and precedence of some other Sanyasis in the plaint temple during the annual Vaikasi festival, that is to say, they claimed precedence to the plaintiff to the honours in question. The first defendants held an enquiry and on the 12 May, 1927 passed orders giving the honours and precedents to these latter claimants and negativing the rights of the plaintiff except on special days of the year. It is claimed in the plaint as before stated that the High Court in appeal and in revision has declared the right of the present plaintiff to be shown the honours in question. Whether the effect of these decisions of the High Court is as they are claimed to be by the appellant it is not necessary in this appeal to decide in view of the fact that we are in entire agreement with the judgment of Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., holding that this suit must be dismissed in limine. The reliefs claimed in the plaint are (1) a declaration that the proceedings of the first defendants, dated 12 May, 1927, are ultra vires and otherwise null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and cannot affect any right of his to the honours and (2) a permanent injunction restraining all the defendants from enforcing the first defendants said order. Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., framed three preliminary issues of which it is only necessary to refer to issue No. 2 which is "whether the plaintiff is entitled to sue for the above declarations (Prayer No. 1 already referred to) having regard to the allegations in paragraph 10, 11 and 12 of the first defendants written statement". Those paragraphs raise the contentions that the plaintiff has no cause of action to sustain the suit against the Defendant Board, that the plaintiff's claim does not relate to any civil or legal right and is therefore not cognisable by the Court and that the plaintiff has no legal right or claim to property in respect whereof the Court can give any declaration and therefore the suit for declaration and consequential relief is not sustainable. The learned trial Judge upon this issue held that the suit must be dismissed because the claim in it was in respect of a right not within Section 9 of the Civil P. C.. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: The Court shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation: - A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.

(2.) As before-stated, the plaintiff concedes that he could not claim the honour or honours in question in a Civil Suit but he argues that this suit does not make such a claim but merely asks for a declaration that what the first defendants have done is ultra vires as being entirely without jurisdiction and that he is entitled to come to a Civil Court for a decision upon that question. This contention seems to us to be open to the objection that, if all that is asked for, is a declaration, it is not a relief which a Civil Court can give him unless some consequential relief is also prayed for. We do not propose to refer to the numerous authorities in support of this objection which were relied upon and followed by the learned trial Judge in his judgment. It will be sufficient to refer to only one of them, viz., Deokali Koer V/s. Kedar Nath (1912) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 704 a decision of Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., and Chatterjee, J., which states the law as to declaratory decrees under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such a suit ask for any further relief : Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

(3.) Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. says at page 709: The section does not sanction every form of declaration, but only a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property; it is the disregard of this that accounts for the multiform and, at times, eccentric declarations which find a place in Indian plaints.