HIS HOLINESS SRILASRI VYTHILINGA PANDARA SANNADHI, ADHINAKARTHAR, THIRUVADUTHURAI MUTT Vs. SANKARALINGA THAMBIRAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Civil Revision Petition is presented against a decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Tanjore upon issue No. 1 in the suit which was: Is the Thiruvaduthurai mutt a public, charitable or religious institution within the meaning of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, and is the suit-sustainable under the said section?

(2.) The Additional Subordinate Judge gave his decision upon this issue on the 22nd December, 1932, finding that the mutt was a public and charitable religious institution within the meaning of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code and that the suit was therefore sustainable under that section. The objection taken to this decision is that the Judge has failed to distinguish between an endowment for the general support of the mutt and a specific endowment for a specific purpose and that the former purpose is not one which makes the mutt a charitable or religious institution within the meaning of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of this revision petition was taken by the respondents, it being contended that an appeal from the decree in the suit lies to the High Court, that the question before us is one which has to be decided in such an appeal and that a decision upon one of several issues in the suit is not a decision upon the case, and therefore no Civil Revision Petition can be entertained. In support of this contention a decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, viz., in Buddhu Lal V/s. Mewa Ram (1921) I.L.R. 43 All. 564 (F.B.) was relied upon. This decision certainly supports the preliminary objection but it was not the unanimous decision of the Full Bench of five because two of its number dissented from the majority view and held that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application in revision, Walsh, J., one of the dissenting Judges stating that in the Allahabad High Court there were pronounced and irreconcilable differences of principle in the practice followed by different Judges. Apart from the fact that in this case the decision was not unanimous, there are decisions of this High Court taking a contrary view to that taken by the majority of the Full Bench in that case, and we see no reason why we should therefore seek authority from elsewhere. One of the Madras decisions is Balakrishna Odayar V/s. Jagannadha Chariar (1924) 48 M.L.J. 534 a decision of Wallace and Madhavan Nair, JJ. In that case the Court had to consider issue No. 1 in the suit which as in the present case raised the question of the maintainability of the suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code: The Court decided that it was a fit matter for revision, holding that, if the suit is not maintainable at all, interference by the High Court in revision would prevent further waste of time and money; and it was on that account that the revision petition was entertained though it was stated that interference in revision with findings in a pending suit is not a matter which the High Court will view with favour, and it will require a very strong proof of want of jurisdiction or irregular exercise of jurisdiction to warrant interference. Another case is the decision of Curgenven, J., in Ranganayaki Bai Ammal V/s. Shivarama Dubay (1929) 58 M.L.J. 104 at 105 to the same effect and in the course of his judgment reference is made to other reported cases of this High Court, Curgenven, J., stating: I think it must be said that there is now a course of decisions in favour of interference sufficiently marked to render it undesirable that a single Judge should take the opposite view.

(3.) In our opinion, it is clear that it has been the practice of this High Court to exercise its revisional powers in such cases and therefore the preliminary objection must be overruled. But it by no means follows that, because the High Court has the power to interfere in revision, in such cases it must necessarily do so. On the contrary, we are definitely of the view that the High Court ought not to do so unless the particular point can be shortly and conveniently disposed of by way of a Civil Revision Petition, and it seems to us that this is certainly not such a case. We may usefully refer to two decisions of the Privy Council, viz., Mahomed Soleiman V/s. Birendra Chandra Singh (1922) L.R. 50 I.A. 247 : I.L.R. 50 Cal. 243 : 44 M.L.J. 388 (P.C.) and Jagannath Rao Dani V/s. Rambharosa (1932) L.R. 60 I.A. 49 : 64 M.L.J. 142 (P.C.) where it is stated that it is the duty of the Courts in India to pronounce upon all important points in an appealable case. It is conceded that some of the endowments in question were for a specific purpose. Hence it follows that to the extent of those endowments at least, the lower Court must frame a scheme. The petitioner, however, is unable to tell us the extent of those endowments and the position is that he is unable to urge anything more than an objection to the framing of a scheme with regard to the endowments for the general purposes of the mutt and is unable to say whether these endowments form the larger part of the endowments of the mutt or what the extent of them is. Both sides are here with a large mass of authorities upon this question and it may be necessary also to examine some of the evidence given in the case and in this connection we must observe that a large member of witnesses were called in the lower Court and a mass of documents considered and the Additional Subordinate Judge has dealt with this matter in a judgment which consists of 114 paragraphs covering 114 pages of the printed record. Whilst giving all credit to the learned Judge for his great care, it is, in our opinion, a judgment of quite unnecessary length. Not to be outdone in prolixity, the petitioner here has presented a memorandum of Civil Revision Petition which consists of 51 paragraphs covering 11 pages of the printed record. Most of these paragraphs cover the same objection; and many of them quote reported decisions of Benches and Full Benches of this High Court and decisions of the Privy Council and contain legal arguments upon them and contentions that the trial Judge has erroneously misapplied them and as to how he has misapplied them and has failed to note distinguishing features in them. We feel bound to register our strong protest against such a gross misuse of grounds of petition or memorandum of appeal to the High Court. These should only contain very briefly and concisely the grounds upon which it is contended the Court's decision is wrong. To state the same ground or grounds again in different language, besides being a waste of time, can serve no useful purpose. It should be unnecessary to add further that, in the grounds of revision and appeals to the High Court, to set out legal arguments is an entire misconception of what is right and proper, and is contrary to the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We decline to deal with this matter by way of revision and this petition must accordingly be dismissed with costs.