LAWS(PVC)-1934-1-46

SINGARAVELU PILLAI Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE

Decided On January 16, 1934
SINGARAVELU PILLAI Appellant
V/S
BOARD OF REVENUE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has applied for a writ of certiorari with a view to quashing the proceedings of the Board of Revenue by which respondent 2 in this petition was appointed to the office of karnam. The Zamindar of Ariyalur appointed the petitioner as karnam on 2 January, 1929. The petitioner was an outsider with no mirasi right. In 1932 two suits were brought under Section 13, Madras Act 3 of 1895, with a view to obtaining the post of karnam. One of these suits was brought by respondent 2 and the other was brought by his brother. In accordance with the provisions of Rules 24-A and 27 of the rules framed by the Board of Revenue under Section 20 of the Act, as to the procedure in suits, the present respondent 2 was joined as defendant in the suit brought by his brother. After this had been done, he withdrew his own suit without obtaining permission to bring a fresh suit. The suit by his brother was then heard by the Deputy Collector of Ariyalur who gave a decree not in favour of the plaintiff but in favour of the present respondent 2. Against this decree there was an appeal by the present petitioner, and on appeal the District Collector gave a decree to the present petitioner. There was then a further appeal to the Board of Revenue by respondent 2. That there is such a right of appeal is made clear by the proviso to Clause 1, Section 23 of the Act. The Board of Revenue set aside the decree of the District Collector and restored that of the Deputy Collector by which respondent 2 was appointed karnam.

(2.) It is contended for the petitioner that when a suit is brought in this way for any village office the only decree that can be given is either one dismissing the suit or one in favour of the plaintiff. It is pointed out that respondent 2 has withdrawn his own suit and had come to be only in the position of a defendant; and it is argued that even if it was found that he had a better right to the office than the plaintiff no decree (could be given in his favour. On the other hand it is argued by the learned Government Pleader and by the learned advocate for respondent 2 that it is competent for a Court in a suit of this kind not. only to decide which of the parties, even if that party be the defendent, has the best right to the post but also to give a decree to the person whom it finds to have the best right. In favour of these contentions attention is called to Rules 24-A, 27, 39 and 45-A of the rules framed by the Board of Revenue. By Rules 24-A and 27 it is proved that the plaintiff shall join as defendants all persona whom he knows or has reason to believe are nearer heirs than himself to the office, and Rule 27 allows the Collector to return a plaint if this provision is not complied with. It is in accordance with that Rule 24-A that respondent 2 was added as a party defendant to the suit that is now under notice. By Rule 39 a person who has been cited as a defendant under Rule 24-A or Rule 34-A, which is another provision as to adding persons having superior claims, must make a statement in writing renouncing his claim to the office or oppose the claims of the other parties-by establishing the superiority of his own.

(3.) By Rule 45-A it is provided that if such person renounces his claim to the office or fails to oppose successfully the claims of the other parties, such person shall be precluded from subsequently filing a suit for the same office. With reference-to these provisions it is contended that the Court that tries suits of this nature-can decide once for all between the claims of the several parties and give a decree to the person found to have the best right. There is however no provision which says that a decree in favour of any other party can be granted, and in-the ordinary course one would suppose that the proper decree should either be to allow the suit or to dismiss it. I do not think it necessary for me to give a definite pronouncement now upon this point. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Lakshmanan Chettiar V/s. Corporation of Madras A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 130 that an objection of such a kind should be raised as early as possible. I am not satisfied that the objection was raised in the first Court, i.e., in the Court of the Deputy Collector. Rather am I led to suppose that the contrary was the case. Respondent 2 no doubt must have bean under the impression that he would get a decree in the suit brought by his brother. That must be the reason why he withdrew his own suit, though of course if he made a mistake in so leaving his position in that manner that cannot help him. But as it seems to me it was not merely what was the impression of respondent 2, but it was the attitude of all the parties, that the matter should be adjudicated upon once for all and a decree given to the person who was found to have the best right to the office. This I take to be the case from the wording of issue 3 which runs thus: If not, who among them, if any, is entitled to succeed and be appointed to the office.