RATANSEY VIRJI Vs. MEGHJI HIRJI JANGEALI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. justice Mirza. The plaintiff was a member of the Cutchi Dassa Oswal caste. Defendant No. 3 is the acting President of the caste, and the other defendants are prominent members of the caste. The caste have authorised defendants Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to defend the suit. The plaintiff claims a declaration that the resolution dated August 26, 1932, expelling him from the caste is invalid and of no effect, and an injunction to restrain the defendants from giving effect to the resolution. The material facts can be shortly stated. In the month of August, 1932, namely, on August 3 and 9, the plaintiff wrote two letters to defendant No. 3, which are exhibits A and B, in which he criticised the conduct of defendant No. 3, when he was acting as President of the Mahajan or caste meeting. The letters are couched in quite courteous terms, and the criticism is not, I should have thought, of a very serious character, and I am disposed to agree with the learned trial Judge ,that if defendant No. 3 had been more a man of the world, he would not have troubled much about this criticism. However, he seems to have taken offence at these letters, and decided to bring the matter before a meeting of the caste. Accordingly, notice was given to the plaintiff "that a meeting of the caste would be held at which these letters would be considered, and at the same time notice of the meeting was given to all; the members by a notice which was affixed to the meeting place, in which it was stated that the letters would be placed before the meeting for proper action, and the fact that the letters made allegations against defendant No. 3 as President was referred to. There is, I think, not the slightest doubt that the plaintiff received a proper notice of the meeting and of the various adjournments. Eventually, the meeting was held on. August 26, having been adjourned on various previous occasions, and at that meeting the plaintiff appeared and gave his defence. He then asked for an adjournment, which the caste refused, there already having been, one adjournment at the plaintiff's request, and the caste finally decided that they would fine the plaintiff Rs. 101 for his offence in writing the two letters in question, and then they passed a further resolution to the effect that if the fine was not paid within twenty-four hours the plaintiff should be outcasted. Thereupon the plaintiff immediately started this suit.

(2.) Various points have been taken on behalf of the plaintiff, which are dealt with exhaustively in the judgment; of the learned trial Judge. It is said that the letters involved no caste offence, and that the caste did not proceed in accordance with the rules of natural justice, but it is not necessary, I think, to deal with any of the points taken except one, and that is that the caste did not proceed in accordance with its own rules. That point was taken by the plaintiff in the plaint, and the answer made to it was a denial by the defendants that the caste had not proceeded in accordance with the rules. Now, it appears that in the month of August, 1904, certain rules were made by this caste, and it was provided that all the work of the Mahajan would be carried on according to the rules so long as no changes were made therein, and that the various committees and servants of the Mahajan and the Mahajan itself should act agreeably to the rules. Then the 8th rule deals with the question of punishment of members of the caste. That rule provides :- If it is found that any member or family of the Mahajan has committed any-offence whatever with reference to the community, then such member or family will be called before the meeting of the Managing Committee for inquiry, and if the aforesaid Committee finds anyone guilty after giving him full opportunity to defend himself and after fully considering every matter, then proper punishment will be, meted out to him with the consent of the Mahajan.

(3.) That, I think, is the only material part of the rule, which appears to contemplate four steps. First of all, there must be a finding that a member has committed an offence. That probably means that it must be made to appear- whether to the Mahajan or its committee is not apparent -but it must be made to appear that there is prima facie reason for thinking that a member has committed an offence. Then, secondly, that: member has to be called before the meeting of the managing committee; and, thirdly, the managing committee has to give full opportunity to him to defend himself, and it has to consider fully every matter. If it finds the member guilty, then the fourth step is that proper punishment is to be meted out to him with the consent of the Mahajan, which seems to mean that the committee has to propose the punishment, but the Mahajan itself has to consent to the punishment. Now, it is quite clear that in this case the second and third stages provided for by the rules were omitted altogether, and the fourth stage was altered. When, at the meeting of August 26, the Mahajan came to the conclusion that there was an offence by the plaintiff, its duty under the rule was to refer the matter for inquiry to the managing committee. That the Mahajan did not do. After the committee had inquired, giving the plaintiff full opportunity to be heard before it, and after the committee had suggested a proper punishment, then only could the Mahajan consent to that punishment. Instead of doing that, the Mahajan themselves entered into an inquiry. As far as I can see, they gave the plaintiff a perfectly fair hearing, but the plaintiff did not get the hearing to which he was entitled under the rule, namely, the hearing before the committee; he got a hearing before the whole Mahajan, and the punishment meted out was not the punishment suggested by the committee; it was a punishment imposed by resolution of the whole Mahajan. Therefore, it is perfectly plain that the expulsion of the plaintiff was not in accordance with the rule.