K P RAMAN MENON Vs. MALABAR FOREST AND RUBBER COMPANY LIMITED, IN LIQUIDATION NOW REPRESENTED BY HHWADIA, ESQ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff is the appellant. His suit was dismissed in the trial Court and his appeal to the District Court was also dismissed.

(2.) The appellant by Ex. E, a lease deed, dated the 4 February, 1924, leased the suit properties to one Nilkanath Narayan Khale for a term of 75 years. It was admitted during the trial and in the lower Appellate Court and here that Khale was a benamidar for the Malabar Forest and Rubber Company, Limited. The High Court of Bombay on the 8 July, 1926, made an order for the compulsory winding up of that company on a petition, dated the 12 May, 1926, presented by Messrs. Sabnis & Co., the Managing Agents of the Company to whom Khale had assigned his rights under the lease, and Mr. Moos was appointed the Official Liquidator of the Company and represents them here as the first respondent. The point for consideration is whether there has been a forfeiture of the lease giving the appellant the right of re-entry as claimed by him. Both the lower Courts, upon a consideration of Ex. E, have negatived the appellant's claim. The material part of the forfeiture clause in Ex. E, reads as follows: or if the lessee becomes bankrupt the lease shall ipso facto cease and this shall be void and lessor shall have the right to re-enter and take possession of the said premises as if this lease were non-existent and without the lessee being entitled to claim damages or compensation of any kind from the lessor.

(3.) The appellant claims that by reason of this clause the company by going into liquidation has forfeited the lease. The appellant contends that the words "lessee becomes bankrupt" mean and are intended to mean, as regards the word "lessee" the company, and, as regards the word "bankrupt", its being ordered to be wound up by the Court. It is argued that the parties to Ex. E, regarded company as the lessee and not Khale who admittedly was merely the benamidar for the company, that the contract really was with the company and not with Khale, and that it was the company's going into liquidation and not the insolvency of Khale that was to incur the forfeiture and give the appellant the right of re-entry.