(1.) THE surety, defendant 1 is the appellant. THE first point pressed is that there is no money due from defendant 2 to the plaintiffs. Both the Courts have found that the discharge pleaded is not proved. This point cannot be pressed in second appeal. THE second point is whether the plaintiffs, i.e., the President, the Treasurer and the Committee, who admittedly manage the temple affairs, though there are fifty Uralars for the temple, can maintain the suit. It is not denied that the management has been entrusted by all the Uralars to the plaintiffs. This is not a case where the trusteeship has been delegated by a trustee to a stranger. Prom amongst the trustees themselves they have, to facilitate management, authorised a Committee of five trustees to look after the temple affairs. This Committee appointed defendant 2 as Samudayi and is now claiming moneys due from him during hits management from 16 September 1925 to 2l November, 1925. I cannot sea how the cases which say that a trustee cannot delegate his trusteeship to a stranger can apply to this case. No authority has been cited in support (of the appellant's contention that (delegation to a Committee of trustees by all the trustees of powers of management is invalid. Further in the present case the plaintiffs obtained permission to sue on behalf of all the Uralars if there is want of power to institute the suit at the start, that omission has been made good by obtaining the sanction of the Court. THE third point is whether there has been a variation of the original contract between the Samudayi and the manager which will put an end to the liability of the surety.
(2.) ON this point also the lower Court has found against the appellant. This finding is a finding of fact. The last point is that the liability of defendant 1 was terminated when defendant 2 for whom ho stood surety was appointed a second time. This point was not raised in the pleadings or in the issues. No other points ware argued before me the second appeal is dismissed with costs.