ILAPAVALURI CHALAPATHI RAO Vs. DINGALI RANGANAYAKAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts in this case are somewhat complicated and it is necessary to state them in order to make plain what the points in dispute are. Defendant 1, the appellant, is the purchaser from one Murripudi Venkatachalam (hereinafter referred to as V) whose title found on two facts, viz. (1) he claims to be the reversioner to the rights of one Masipatla Tarabayi (whom I will call T) by right of the fact that he is the lady's father's younger brother's son; (2) the rights of T were on 4 March 1922, voluntarily surrendered by T to V by a deed of surrender (Ex. 4) duly registered. The reversionary right and the present right being thus combined V had to all appearances the whole right and this right he sold a few days after the surrender for Rs. 8,000 by a deed of sale (Ex. 13) to one Ilapavaluri Chalapathi Rao, defendant 1. The plaintiff claims as the daughter of T who died fifteen months after the deed of surrender and alleges that her mother's estate in that land was an absolute estate left to T's mother Seshamma by Maripudi Lakshmikanta Rao, Seshamma's husband, by a will (Ex. A) dated 17th April 1896, whereby it is said Seshamma was left not a widow's estate but an absolute estate as stridhanam property which Seshamma devised to her daughter T under a will (Ex. B), and which passed on T's death to plaintiff.

(2.) It is also said (1) the surrender deed was benami, a mere nominal transaction having no effect and (2) whether benami or not it purported to surrender quite a different right from the right in fact possessed by T and did not accordingly operate to transfer the right which T actually had. It is said that the purchaser gave no consideration for the property, the sale was a bogus transaction, the promissory notes alleged to have been paid were all bogus and forged or at any event the endorsements of payment in them are all forged, that the purchaser had no money with which to pay the holders or in any event did not pay them and the whole transaction made up of the surrender and the sale was an elaborate conspiracy to defeat the rights of creditors, and has in law no effect. The suit is filed (plaint dated 2nd December 1926) after a decision given by Devadoss, J., in S. A. No. 1731 of 1925 on 23rd September 1926 wherein that learned Judge decided that the will (Ex. A) gave to Seshamma an absolute estate. Against that decision, and after this plaint was filed, a Letters Patent appeal was filed and Odgers and Jackson, JJ., reversed the decision and held that Seshamma took only a widow's estate. If Seshamma took only a widow's estate then the reversioner to that interest would be P.W. 5,. i.e., V, the vendor, to defendant 1, and unless the sale was fictitious it is hardly denied that defendant 1 would be entitled. If on the other hand the will conferred an absolute estate then V would have no title unless the deed of surrender clothed him with T's title which title she derived from Seshamma and it is said his purchaser would have no title on two-grounds. (1) The vendor having no title he bought nothing and (2) assuming he would otherwise be entitled to claim on the footing of a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of the defect in title and justified in relying on the deed of surrender as vesting in V all T's estate, he was not a bona fide purchaser for value having given nothing. It will be seen that all difficulty disappears if we were able to agree with the conclusion arrived at by Odgers and Jackson, JJ., in L. P. A. No. 425 of 1926. That decision has already been considered in Krishaswamy Ayyar V/s. Ramchandra Rao 1984 153 IC 1005, by Ramesam and Cornish, JJ. In that case a judgment of the Judicial Committee decided since the above mentioned decision of Odgers and Jackson, JJ. and reported in Shalig Ram V/s. Charanjit Lal 1930 128 IC 265, is referred to, and the view was expressed that the words used in this will were words of sufficient amplitude to convey an absolute estate being not narrower than the words of the gift referred to in Shalig Ram V/s. Charanjit Lal 1930 128 IC 265, which the Judicial Committee held were sufficient to confer an. absolute estate. Sir Vepa Ramesam accordingly expressed the opinion that L. P. A. No. 425 of 1926 was wrongly decided. Cornish, J., agreed generally but did not expressly dissent from the decision arrived at by Odgers and Jack-son, JJ. I do not think one should lightly dissent from a conclusion arrived at on the construction of a will by two learned Judges of this High Court when the same will comes before the Court, and upon the view I take in this case it is not necessary to do so. I therefore leave this matter thus. I agree entirely, if I may respectfully say so with the statement of the law and the analysis of the same law contained in the judgment of Ramesam and Cornish, JJ., in Krishaswamy Ayyar V/s. Ramchandra Rao 1984 153 IC 1005. There the words were: My senior wife and my younger wife, these two persons, shall be entitled to and take the same.

(3.) In this will the correct translation reads: [My fourth wife Seshamma is the only person entitled and no one else is entitled.