KONDHO RAYAGARU Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF GANJAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case raises the question of the validity of a surcharge certificate granted in pursuance of the rules made under the Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act XIV of 1920). Section 120 of that Act provides for the appointment of auditors of the accounts of Local funds. Section 199 enacts that the Local Government may make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act not inconsistent therewith and goes on to say, that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, they shall have power to make rules "as to the powers of auditors to disallow and surcharge items and as to the recovery of sums disallowed or surcharged". (Clause O.) Under the authority conferred by this section, the Local Government made certain rules, known shortly as surcharge Rules with which we are now concerned. Rule 3 says that the auditors appointed under Section 120 of the Act shall report to the Board (to quote only the relevant part) any loss of money caused by the neglect or misconduct of any person responsible for such loss. Then Rule 4 follows, which provides that the President shall forthwith remedy the defect that has been pointed out by the auditor. Then, we come to the most important rule, which is Rule 5. It must first be noted that this rule refers to a different auditor, different from the auditor already referred to. The powers and duties of this auditor are not strictly confined to auditing, but as quasi-judicial functions are to be performed by him, the auditor referred to is one "empowered by the Local Government". So much of that rule as is material may be quoted in full. Rule 5. - (1) Any auditor empowered by the Local Government may disallow every item contrary to law and surcharge the same on the person making or authorising the making of the illegal payments; and may charge against any person responsible therefor the amount of any deficiency or loss incurred by the negligence or misconduct of that person or of any sum which ought to have been but is not brought to account by that person and shall, in every such case, certify the amount due from such person. (2) The auditor shall state in writing the reasons for his decision in respect of every disallowance, surcharge or charge and furnish by registered ; post a copy thereof to the person against whom it is made.

(2.) In the present case what happened was this. Some amounts of house tax collected by the bill collector had not been brought into account. This fact was pointed out in the audit reports both for 1924-1925 and 1926-1927. Under Rule 4 already mentioned, the President ought to have remedied the defect, but that was not done. Thereupon the auditor empowered by the Local Government under Rule 5, i.e., the Examiner of Local Fund Accounts, issued a certificate, dated 12 June, 1929, charging the President of the Board with the amount of the loss on the ground that it was incurred by his negligence. Under Rule 6 any person aggrieved by the decision of the auditor has a right to apply to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to set aside or vary that decision. The President applied under that rule to the District Judge of Ganjam, who in part modified the auditor's decision but as regards the major portion of the claim, confirmed it. In this Revision Petition the District Judge's order is attacked.

(3.) It is first contended that Rule 5 in question is ultra vires the Local Government. The argument is put thus: Section 227 of the Act provides for a suit for compensation against a member of the Local Board for any loss due to his neglect or misconduct, and Clause (2) of that section enacts "every such suit shall be commenced within 3 years after the date on which the cause of action arose". It is argued that if the surcharge rules have j the effect of abrogating this rule of limitation, they are ultra vires, being inconsistent with Section 227 of the Act. Section 199 says that rules may be made "to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act not inconsistent therewith". That the surcharge rules have the effect of carrying out the purposes of the Act, cannot be gainsaid. But the question is, Are these rules inconsistent with the Act or any provision thereof? Section 227 provides merely that the suits shall be commenced within 3 years, whereas the rules do not deal with suits at all. The machinery provided by them is altogether different, prescribing, as they do a summary mode of recovery. The laws of limitation, as has been said, are creatures of statute: under the j Common Law there was no limit of time prescribed for the enforcing of rights. What the section of the Act contemplates is the filing of a suit and it is for such a suit that the limitation is prescribed; a rule that does not provide, limit of time in regard to certificates granted under the special procedure laid down is, in my opinion, not inconsistent with the section.