SRIMATI DULHIN PHUL KUER Vs. TITAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the Record of Rights of Mauza Bhojpur in Gaya District there is an entry to the effect that the raiyats of the village are jointly in possession of the trees standing on their own holdings and no waste land in the village. The proprietors instituted this suit for declaration of title to the trees and for recovery of possession. The Subordinate Judge considering that the Revenue Officer had on authority under Chap. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act to record rights in trees other than those standing on the raiyats holdings, decreed the suit in part; but on appeal the District. Judge found that the defendants were entitled to the benefit of the presumption under Section 103-B of the Bengal Tenancy Act which had not been rebutted, and so he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.

(2.) The entry in the Record of Rights is of an unusual nature. The raiyats by their written statement attempted to explain it by saying that they had at one time held the milkiat of this village as peasant proprietors bat that when they had transferred the milkiat, they had remained on the land as raiyats and had retained for themselves the rights in the trees of the village which they had formerly enjoyed when they were proprietors. It has been found that the defendants failed to prove the specific contract by which at the time of the transfer of the milkiat, the rights in the trees were reserved; but unless the entry in the Record of Rights was otherwise rebutted by evidence, it was not necessary for the defendants to justify it.

(3.) Mr. Sarjoo Prasad on behalf of the appellants argues that the presumption under Section 103-B of the Bengal Tenancy Act ought not to be applied in the present case because Section 102 of the Bengal Tenancy Act makes no mention of rights in trees, and he suggests further that although the rights in trees standing on a raiyat's own land might be treated as an incident of his tenancy, such rights cannot be so regarded in respect of trees standing on waste land of the village. Now for the general argument, as Mr. P. R. Das points out on behalf of the respondents, it ought in the first place to have been proved as a fact that the Government Notification was in such a form as not to empower the revenue officer to record rights in trees. The argument is based on the assumption that the notification which initiated the survey and settlement proceedings specified all the particulars contained in Section 102 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and no other; but the form of the notification ought to have been proved before any argument could be based on the assumption that the Revenue Officer was not empowered to record these rights, which are essentially rights of an agrarian character, being rights to hold free of rent what would otherwise be liable to be assessed to rent which under Section 193 of the Bengal Tenancy Act would be recoverable under the Act in the same way as agricultural rent.