(1.) This is an application in revision by one of the defendants from an order of the Court below allowing a certain amendment asked for by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had brought a suit for possession of a half share in the house in dispute against the defendants of whom the defendant-applicant alleged to be in possession as a trespasser. It was pleaded in the written statement that the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction inasmuch as the value of the half-share claimed was more than Rs. 5,000. On this the plaintiff applied for an amendment of the plaint expressly stating that she did not want possession of the half share of the house as it stands, but only for the possession of the half share of the house as it stood before the alterations made by the defendant and for the demolition of the superstructures recently put up. It is not necessary to consider in this case whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the modified form in which she has claimed. If it turns out that the value of the subject matter in dispute even after the amendment has been made is in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court below, it would be open to the defendant to take the plea of want of jurisdiction afresh.
(2.) A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the respondents that no revision lies inasmuch as no case has been decided. The Learned Counsel for. the defendants-applicants relies on a number of rulings of this Court in support of the contention that the revision should be entertained. The first case is that of Poran Lal V/s. Rup Chand decided by a Bench of which I was a member. In that case there were many irregularities in the order passed by the Court below and a revision was entertained from the order refusing to supersede the arbitration and appointing a fresh arbitrator and directing him to go on with the arbitration. The authority of the case of Jagannath Sahu V/s. Chhedi Sahu was cited before the Bench and according to that case, the appointment of a new arbitrator which was not authorised was a case decided within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. I accordingly remark. ed that as the Full Bench case of Buddhu Lal V/s. Mewa Ram A.I.R. 1921 All. 1 was not directly against that view, I was not prepared to differ from the view taken by my learned colleague. But in the later case of Risal Singh V/s. Faqira Singh another Bench of which I also was a member, held that no revision lay from an order setting aside an arbitration award as it did not amount to a case decided. Earlier cases deoided by this Court were relied upon by us as authority for the view which we took.
(3.) In the Full Bench case of Lila V/s. Mahange all that we laid down was that the High Court would not ordinarily interfere if another convenient remedy were open to an applicant, but that it could not be laid down as a general proposition that the High Court had no power of interference at all if another remedy were open. That observation was of course confined to cases where the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil P.C., to interfere in revision. I do not think that the Bench in Sidh Nath Tewari V/s. Tej Bahadur Singh A.I.R. 1933 All. 411 interpreted the Full Bench case in any different way. Their remark that the position with regard to revisions was that there was no hard and fast rule about the matter was obviously confined to the question argued before the Bench that inasmuch as there was an undoubted remedy by a suit in respect of matters of which revision was sought, the proper practice for the Court was not to hear the revision; I do not think that the Bench could have intended to lay down that even outside the narrow scope of Section 115, the High Court has any general power of revision whenever it appears to be right, convenient and proper to intervene. Another case relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the applicant is that of Lakshmi Narain Rai V/s. Dip Narain Rai decided by another Bench, in, which it was held that: an order determining the question whether art additional Court-fee should be paid or not, marks the termination of a definite stage of the suit and settles the controversy between the parties on the particular point, and is therefore an order deciding a case.