LAWS(PVC)-1934-1-173

HARJIMAL Vs. SHANTILAL SAKALCHAND

Decided On January 31, 1934
Harjimal Appellant
V/S
Shantilal Sakalchand Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. This application arises out of somewhat unusual circumstances. The applicants, who are the plaintiffs in the suit, brought a suit in the ordinary way for accounts, and, as is the usual practice, paid a tentative court-fee on what was estimated to be the amount due to them. The suit was eventually decreed for Rs. 520-8-0, which was considerably more than the plaintiffs' tentative estimate. The judgment, which was signed on 23rd January 1932, directed the plaintiffs to pay the deficient court-fees within 15 days upon pain of the suit being dismissed if that was not done. After the expiry of this period, but before the decree was drawn up and signed, the plaintiffs applied, on 15th February 1932, for an extension of time. No notice was taken of this application, and on 31st March 1932, the decree, which calls itself the "final decree for rendition of accounts," was drawn up and signed. It reproduces the direction given in the judgment in the following words: Plaintiffs should pay deficient court-fees on Rs. 470-8-0 within 15 days or suit shall stand dismissed.

(2.) AFTER this was done the application for extension seems to have been discovered, for later on in the same day the learned Judge mentions it in his order sheet and fixes a dale for hearing the parties. They were heard on 16th April 1932, and the application was rejected on the same day, on the ground that since the decree itself had fixed the date for payment and prescribed the penalty for failure to comply with its terms, the Court was functus officio. An appeal was then filed to the District Judge against this order. This was also rejected on the ground that no appeal lay against an order of this kind. The plaintiffs have therefore applied to this Court in revision. The first Court relied on Sajjadi Begam v. Dilawar Husain AIR 1918 All 98, where it was held that where the decree itself orders a party to make a payment within a specified time and provides that certain detrimental consequences shall follow in the event of non-compliance with its order, the Court itself has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree, save on an application for review.

(3.) THERE can no longer be any doubt that a Court has power to extend time for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired: Section 148, Civil P.C., 1908. It is true this does not apply when the period has been fixed by a decree: Sajjadi Begam v. Dilawar Husain AIR 1918 All 98. Komal singh v. Jagannath AIR 1918 Nag 66 and Ambadas v. Laxman AIR 1928 Nag 210. But when the application for extension is made before the decree, the Court is bound to consider it and exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 148 one way or the other. The Code allows plaints which have been insufficiently stamped to be rectified Under Order 7, Rule 11. Therefore when a time has been fixed under that rule, the Court has jurisdiction to extend it Under Section 148, in proper cases; and when it fails to consider an application through a mistake of its own, it has inherent jurisdiction to rectify its mistake, even though it means the reopening of a decree. For Courts exist to administer justice, and rules which have been framed for the attainment of that end should not be used to frustrate it. They are necessary to prevent confusion and. chaos, and must ordinarily be applied with strictness to ensure diligence in the conduct of affairs which affect the destinies of others. But that predicates diligence on the part of the Court and its officials too, and when they have not been diligent justice requires that no party should be allowed to suffer because of their negligence.