BADAR RAHIM Vs. BADHSHAH MEAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision by one Badar Rahim of Chittagong, the muttawali of a certain wakf, which was created in the year 1907; against the order of the District Judge of Chittagong dated 9 November 1933; granting permission to the opposite parties to sue the petitioner Under Section 18, Religious Endowments Act (Act 20 of 1863). The only point urged in support of the application is that the wakf having been created after the year 1863 the provisions of Act 20 of 1863 are not applicable to this wakf. Under Section 18 of the Act no suit under that Act can be entertained without the permission of the Court to institute such a suit. The opposite parties applied to the Court for leave to sue the petitioner Under Section 14 of the Act which runs as follows: any person or persons interested in any mosque, temple or religious establishment, or in the performance of the worship or of the service thereof, or the trusts relating thereto, may, without joining as plaintiff or any of the other persons interested therein, sue before the civil Court the trustee, manager or superintendent of such, mosque, temple or religious establishment or the member of any committee appointed under this Act, for any misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty, committed by such trustee, manager, superintendent on member of such committee, in respect of the trusts vested in or confided to them respectively.

(2.) If Section 14 does not apply to the wakf in question, leave cannot be granted Under Section 18 of the Act. It is not disputed in this case that the wakf in question, is a religious endowment and the petitioner is the trustee or manager or superintendent of the said endowment. It is also not disputed that the opposite parties are the persons inter, ested in the said endowment. The only point for determination therefore is whether the petitioner is a trustee or manager of a religious establishment of such a character as is mentioned in Section 14 of the Act. The words used in Section 14. namely, "appointed under this Act," refer only to the committee and not to the trustee, manager or superintendent. See the observations of Norman, J. in the case of Ganesh Singh, V/s. Ramgopal Singh, (1870), 5 Beng LR 55 App. The trustee or manager who can be sued under the Act therefore need not necessarily be a trustee or; manager appointed under the Act. The section speaks of the trustee or manager of any mosque, temple or religious establishment. Now what is the meaning of the words "any mosque, temple or religious endowment? " Do they mean mosques, temples or religious endowments to which only the provisions of the Act apply or do they include also mosques, temples or religious establishments to which the provisions of the Act do not apply at all. In the case of Delrua Banoo Begum V/s. Asgur All Khan, (1875) 23 WR 453, It was held that the Religious Endowments Act applies only to endowments for public purposes. That case went up to the Privy Council; and although their Lordships disposed of the appeal on another point they observed that they saw no reason for disagreeing with that part of the judgement of the High Court where it was held that the endowment was not of such a public character as would sustain a suit under Act 20 of 1863. See Asgar Ali Khan V/s. Derlus Banoo Begum, (1877) 3 Cal 324 (PC). This view was also taken in Protap Chandra V/s. Brojo Nath, (1892) 19 Cal 275 and Ram Prosad Gupta V/s. Ramkishun Prasad, 1932 Pat 177 In the case of Fakruddin Sahib v. Ackeni Sahib, (1878) 2 Mad 197, though it was observed by the learned Judges that Section 14 is general in its application, it is not clear from the judgment in that case that the religious institution involved in that case was not of a public character. In our judgment the religious institution contemplated in Section 14 must be a religious institution of a public character. The next question is whether the religious institutions referred to in Section 14 are those endowments only which are mentioned in the preamble of the Act ; in other words whether the preamble can be legitimately consulted to fix the meaning of the words in the enacting part.

(3.) The preamble of a statute has been said to be a good means of finding out its meaning, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it ; and, as it usually states, or professes to state, the general object and intention of the legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt: (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute, Edn. 7, pp, 37 and 38.) But the preamble cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part, when the language and the object and scope of the Act are not open to doubt. It is unusual to find that the enacting part is not exactly co- extensive with the preamble. In many Acts of Parliament, although a particular mischief is recited, the legislative provisions extend beyond it. The preamble is often no more than a recital of some of the inconveniences, and does not exclude any others for which a remedy is given by the statute. The evil recited is but the motive for legislation; the remedy may both consistently and wisely be extended beyond the cure of that evil, and if on a review of the whole Act a wider intention than that expressed in the preamble appears to be the real one, effect is to be given to it notwithstanding the less extensive import of the preamble. And generally although in cases where the meaning of the words used in a statute is absolutely clear, the Court has no right to go beyond them: when the words are capable of one meaning, and at the same time of a more extended meaning the Court will look to the object and policy of the Act to see what meaning they ought to have: Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 7, pp. 39 40.