SHYAM LAL Vs. HIRA NATH CHELA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the plaintiff against an idol, Nageshwar Mahadeo, established in Dehra Dun through one Mahant Hira Nafch. The suit had originally been led against Hira Nath alone, but on the objection of Hira Nath, the idol was made the defendant, and Hira Nath was described as the Mahant representing the idol. Shortly, the plaintiff's case was this. On 23 May 1908, Hira Nath, as the Mahant and manager of the temple of Nageshwar Mahadeo, executed in favour of one Shyam Lal, son of Tika Ram, a lease in respect of a certain area of land for a period of 30 years, The successor in title of the lessee, Shyam Lal, son of Tika Ram, granted a sub-lease to the plaintiff, who is also known as Shyam Lal, on 28 September 1920. The plaintiff was in possession, but the defendant wag interfering with his possession and therefore the prayer was fore declaration of title, including a declaration that under the terms of the lease, the lease was renewable for another period of 30 years, recovery of a sum of Rs. 90 as mesne profits and for a perpetual injunction.

(2.) The idol, who on the amendment of the plaint is the sole defendant, contended that the property belonged to him and that Hira Nath could not make a transfer of the same without legal necessity. A further plea was taken that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court. Both the Courts below held that the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court on the ground that the prayer for injunction could not be granted by the Revenue Court. They further held that the transaction was not for the benefit of the idol and therefore was not binding on him. The suit was accordingly dismissed.

(3.) In this Court on behalf of the respondents the plea of want of jurisdiction in the Civil Court has been urged in support of the decrees of the Courts below. It is therefore necessary to consider this point before the merits are examined. There can be no doubt that under Section 230, Tenancy Act, 1926, if adequate relief could be granted by the Revenue Court, it would be immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court is not identical with that which the Revenue Court could have granted. Thus if a suit be in its essence cognizable by a Revenue Court, the addition, say a prayer for injunction, will not take the case out of the cognizance of that Court. The ground therefore upon which the Courts below proceeded is not tenable.