RAGHUBAR DAYAL Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The judgments of the Courts below are impossible judgments and must be reversed. The judgment of the trial Magistrate is a document full of special pleadings for the prosecution. It exhibits in a remarkable degree an utter disregard of repeated judicial pronouncements emphasising that in cases arising out of security proceedings the Courts ought to approach the consideration of the case in a fair way, having regard to the interest not only of the prosecution, but also of the accused. It teems with unfounded assumptions made as regards the credibility and impartiality of the evidence led by the Crown and with fantastic reasons for discarding the evidence for the defence. It is marked by an absence of logical reasoning and is unredeemed by slightest tinge of judicial balance. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is an abridged edition of the judgment of the learned Magistrate and is open to the criticism, to which it has been subjected by the Learned Counsel for the applicant, that the Judge without examining the evidence for himself as he was in duty bound to do contented himself by briefly summarising the reasons contained in the judgment of the Magistrate, as a justification for affirming in appeal the order passed by the Magistrate.

(2.) If the Courts below approach the consideration of the case in a fair way and subject the evidence both for the prosecution and for the defence to legitimate criticisms this Court is relieved from the necessity of weighing the evidence in criminal revisions. Where however as in the present case, it is clear from the judgment of the Courts below that the evidence has not been fairly considered, it is imperative to examine the evidence with a view to test the accuracy of the decisions of the Courts below and an examination of the evidence in the present case has led me to the conclusion that the decisions of the Courts below are indefensible. The applicant, Raghubar Brahmin is a substantial tenant residing in village Laturra in the District of Agra. The Ferozabad police reported to the Sub- divisional Magistrate that Ragubar is a thief and house-breaker by habit and associates with confirmed bad characters and, on receipt of this information, the learned Magistrate called upon Raghubar to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with sureties for his good behaviour for a period of one year. The evidence of 25 witnesses on behalf of prosecution and of 32 witnesses on behalf of the defence was recorded by the learned Magistrate. Both parties wanted to examine more witnesses, but the learned Magistrate did not, to quote his words, "allow the parties to examine witnesses ad infinitum." It appears that 20 witnesses were summoned through Court by Raghubar and on the date fixed for the recording of the defence evidence, a list containing the names of 166 defence witnesses was filed in Court. The Magistrate ordered that "the statements be recorded." The Magist rate however ordered, again to quote his own words, the prosecution to furnish 15 of their best witnesses, and asked the accused to examine up to 30 of his best witnesses for general reputation.

(3.) It is needless to observe that the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate has no sanction in law and the Magistrate had no right to arbitrarily limit the number of witnesses whom the accused wanted to examine in his defence. It is not that the Magistrate cut short the number of defence witnesses on the ground that a large number of witnesses were proposed to be examined for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. It is to be remembered that a person who is called upon to furnish security under Section 110, Cr.P.C., is entitled like other accused persons to have his full say in the matter and there is no warrant in law for calling upon such a person to play the role of a Judge and to decide for himself who are his "best witnesses" and examine only such witnesses in his defence.