VADDADI KAMARAJU Vs. KOCHERLAKOTA VENKATALAKSHMIPATHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act it is enacted that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate or other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. It is, therefore, clear that a reversioner in expectancy cannot validly transfer his spes successionis ; and that doctrine has been carried by this Court a step further in the case reported in Jagannadha Raju V/s. Prasada Rao (1915) ILR 39 M 554 : 28 MLJ 650 that not only are transfers of expectancies forbidden but that contracts to transfer them when the reversioner enters into possession are also forbidden on the ground that, were it not so held, the provisions of the Act would be rendered entirely nugatory and futile. That reasoning of this Court has been accepted by the Privy Council in the case of Annada Mohan Roy V/s. Gour Mohan Mullick LR (1923) 50 IA 239 : 45 MLJ 617 (PC). In the present case the plaintiff brought a suit in order to assert his position as reversioner to the estate of one Subbaraju. He impleaded the widow and various other persons who alleged themselves to be alienees from her ; and he was confronted with this that in the year 1904 he brought a declaratory suit to have his position as reversioner to Subbaraju's estate declared and that suit had been settled by a compromise and a judgment based on it, the brief effect of which was that the plaintiff withdrew his claim provided that he was given as he was given certain lands which were in dispute between the parties. I intend! to guard myself from deciding this case on any wider ground than is absolutely necessary to this decision. After the very learned and instructive arguments I have heard of I think one may fairly say that the effect of the decisions of the Privy Council referred to, viz., Amrit Narayan Singh V/s. Gaya Singh LR (1917) 45 IA 35 : 34 MLJ 298 (PC), Kanhai Lai V/s. Brij Lal (1918) ILR 40 A 487 :35 MLJ 459 (PC) and Annada Mohan Roy V/s. Gour Mohan Mullick LR (1923) 50 IA 239 : 45 MLJ 617 (PC), to which I have already referred to, is to draw a line of demarcation between the cases and show clearly the principle in the light of which one is to decide, that is to say, on which side of the line a case with a given set of facts is to be decided. The distinction, I mean, can be stated in this way correctly enough for the purpose of this case : that the relinquishment of a reversionary right cannot be the consideration for a compromise. But, while a man cannot relinquish his reversionary right in given properties, he can relinquish his right to say that the properties in dispute form part of the estate to which he is the reversioner ; he may for good consideration admit that the properties never formed part of the estate of the person from whom he claims and therefore he is not relinquishing his reversionary right to that estate but is merely admitting that the properties with which the dispute is concerned were not properties which formed part of the estate to which he was a reversioner. In order to ascertain on which side of the line this case falls one has to note the circumstances and what the words of the agreement are. I need not read the plaint--nothing turns on it but the defence in the suit of 1904 is material. Paragraph 5 of the written statement alleged that the properties in question in both these suits formed the self-acquisition of the 1st defendant and she was entitled to alienate it at her pleasure. Then with regard to the rest of the property paragraph 10 says this: At the time of his death the 1 defendant's husband gave the remaining half also of the said house-site to the 2nd defendant for purposes of dwelling with absolute rights. Since then the 2nd defendant has been living there with family. Later on the 2nd defendant's husband built thereon a tiled house which at the time of the marriage of the 2nd defendant's daughter was given away as a katnam (present) to the 3rd defendant.

(2.) That was the issue that the parties desired to dispose of in that suit; and then somebody intervened and brought them together and a compromise was filed in the suit and the agreement was as follows: In respect of the 4 acres of land together with the various fruit trees thereon the defendants shall in 30 days time from this date execute a registered deed, with the usual recitals in favour of the plaintiff in view to the enjoyment thereof by plaintiff with absolute rights and that thereupon the plaintiff shall withdraw this suit.

(3.) That is what he got and it is to be noted that he got not merely an admission that the property was considered to belong to him but a conveyance to him from the defendants as the defendants were but for this agreement the owners of this property. It goes on to say- That in case the whole of the remaining suit property is enjoyed by the defendants with full rights according to their previous enjoyment, no dispute of any kind will be ever raised by the plaintiff.