A H TURNER Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was tried by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta on charges under Section 468, I.P.C., Section 471, read with Section 465, I.P.C., and Section 420, read with Section 511, I.P.C., or in the alternative under Section 385, I.P.C. He has been acquitted of the charge under Section 468, I.P.C., arid convicted on the other charges. The learned Magistrate sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment on the charge under Section 471, read with Section 465, I.P.C., and to six months rigorous imprisonment under Section 420, read with Section 511, I.P.C., or in the alternative under Section 385, I.P.C., the two sentences to run consecutively. It is not necessary for us in the present appeal to deal with the facts of the case inasmuch as at the very outset we are met with a difficulty which arises by reason of the fact that the document which the appellant is said to have used and in consequence of which the charge under Section 471, read with Section 465, I.P.C., was framed is really one which is a valuable security within the definition of that expression as contained in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. The document in question is a counterfoil of a paying-in slip which purports to be an acknowledgment of receipt of a sum of Rs. 55,000 by the bank at whose instance the proceedings in this case were instituted. It bears the impression of a rubber stamp put upon it by the bank officials stating that the amount mentioned in the counterfoil had been received by the bank. On the face of the document, it purports to be an acknowledgment in respect of that amount and, therefore, purports to be an acknowledgment that the bank is under a legal liability to hold the amount in deposit on behalf of the appellant and to pay it to him or at his requisition. It does not matter that it is not a stamped document. It is clear therefore, that it comes within the definition of "valuable security" as laid down in Section 30, I.P.C. The case was, therefore, one which was triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions and the earned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with it in the way that he did.

(2.) We have been asked by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant to go into the facts in order to determine whether there should or should not be a commitment in this case. Regard being had, however, to the fact that the appellant was convicted in respect of the offences mentioned above I think that a prima facie case has, as a matter of fact, been made out against him and, therefore, we should refrain from going into the merits.

(3.) In my opinion, the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant should be set aside and the case should be sent back to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate. He will make a proper order committing the case for trial to this Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction. Pending his trial the appellant may be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Walmsley, J.