GIRISH CHANDRA PAL Vs. BAIKUNTHA NATH SINGHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The Court of first instance hold that the plaintiff bad succeeded in proving his title to eight annas of the property in dispute but that he had failed to prove his possession within twelve years of the suit and, in that view, that Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal by the plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing his right to the entire sixteen annas of the property but being of opinion that the plaintiff's suit had not been instituted within 12 years of the date of his dispossession, it upheld the decision of the Court of first instance and dismissed the appeal. Against this decision the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.

(2.) The point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the lower Appellate Court was right in the view that it took on the Question of limitation In so far as it held that the time during which the plaintiff alleged that he bad been in possession by virtue of a decree in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act which he had obtained against the defendants and which decree was ultimately reversed on review and after which reversal the plaintiff was again dispossessed should not be taken into account in computing the period of limitation prescribed for this suit. On this question, the facts are these: The plaintiff was dispossessed from the lands in suit on the 14 November, 1905. He instituted a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, being Suit No. 321 of 1906, against the defendants and it was decreed on the 29 November, 1906. In execution of this decree, the plaintiff took delivery of possession on the 4 of January, 1907. The defendants then applied for a review of the judgment in the Specific Relief Act case and ultimately the plaintiff's suit was dismissed on the 9 January, 1908. After which date the defendants are alleged to have again taken possession of the lands by dispossessing the plaintiff. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on the 4 January, 1919, that is to say, more than twelve years from the date of his original dispossession but well within twelve years from the date, of his subsequent dispossession, or for the matter of that, of the date on which the decree in his favour was reversed. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that the plaintiff must date his cause of action on the date that he was originally dispossess ed and he cannot get an exclusion of the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act during which he may have been in possession under the decree that was subsequently reversed. As an authority for the view that he has taken, the learned Subordinate Judge has relied upon the case of Narayan Chetty v. Kannammai Achi (1905) 28 Mad. 338. The head-note of that case runs: Under Art. 142, Schedule I of the Limitation Act limitation runs from the date of dispossession, and no fresh starting point is given because the party dispossessed subsequently obtains possession under a decree and is ousted from possession when the decree is reversed.

(3.) In that ease, however, the plaintiff was admittedly dispossessed in 1885. It is not possible to ascertain when he was put in possession in execution of the decree which he obtained; but it appears that the suit was instituted by him in 1895 and he was again dispossessed after reversal of that decree and instituted the second suit in 1900. The argument advanced on his behalf was that he was entitled to a deduction of the period during which he was in possession under the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of computing the period under Art. 142 of Schedule I of that Act. That argument did not succeed obviously because the plain words of Section 14 would show that it has no application and no such deduction can be made. The aspect of the question which arises in the present case was not dealt with in that case. That question is this: where a plaintiff being the rightful owner is kept out of possession for less than twelve years and then succeeds in regaining possession (no matter whether in execution of a decree In a possessory suit or in any other way) and then after a time is again dispossessed (no matter whether on reversal of that decree or in any other way) and thereafter institutes a suit for recovery of possession, can he base his suit treating the subsequent dispossession as his cause of action or will the period run from his earlier dispossession for the purpose of Art. 142 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act?