RANGA DASAN Vs. LATCHUMA DASAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff is the Pujari or trustee of the suit temples. It has also been found that the suit property is property attached to the temples. The plaintiff's suit to recover possession has, however, been dismissed on the ground that it is barred by Art. 134 of the Limitation Act.

(2.) It has been held by the Privy Council in Vidyavaruthi V/s. Balusami Aiyar (1921) ILR 44 M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 (PC) that Art. 134 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a case of this kind. The respondents learned vakil seeks to distinguish the present case from the decision in Vidyavaruthi V/s. Balusami Aiyar (1921) ILR 44 M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 (PC) by pointing out that in the Privy Council case the alienation by the trustee complained of was only a permanent lease and not a sale as in this case and reliance is placed upon the following passage in Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mahomed Mustapha Marcayar (1923) ILR 46 M 751 at 757 : 45 MLJ 588 (PC) in support of the distinction. The passage runs as follows : _" This is not, in fact, a transfer by the trustee himself for a valuable consideration, though there is little difference in principle between a transfer under an adverse execution and a sale by the trustee himself, but disregarding that Article, Art. 144 covers the exact case." It will be remembered that in Subbaiya Pandaram V/s. Mahomed Mustapha Marcayar (1923) ILR 46 M 751 : 45 MLJ 588 (PC), the trust property sought to be recovered was acquired by the purchaser under an execution sale and the question was whether the suit was barred under Art. 134 or Art. 144 of the Limitation Act. From the context in which it appears it seems to me that in the passage quoted their Lordships of the Privy Council were only meeting an argument that must have been raised at the bar with reference to Art. 134. They were only pointing out this, namely, that it might be that there is little difference between a transfer under an execution sale, i. e., involuntary transfers, and a sale by the trustee himself, i. e., voluntary transfers; but Art. 134 applies to transfers by the trustee himself for a valuable consideration, namely voluntary transfers. Then their Lordships proceed to discuss the applicability of Art. 144. That no such distinction as is now pointed out was present to their Lordships mind is also clear from the fact that their Lordships in the course of the elaboration of the principle refer to cases of alienation by leases and mortgages. [Cf. Mahomed V/s. Ganapathi(1889) ILR 13 M 277; Jamal Saheb V/s. Murgaya Swami (1885) ILR 10 B 34; Behari Lal V/s. Mohamad Muttaki (1898) ILR 20 A 482 (FB).] The decisions quoted by the learned vakil for the respondents, Madhavarao Vaman V/s. Raghunath Venkatesh (1923) 47 MLJ 248, Kuppuswami Mudaliar V/s. Samia Pillai (1921) 42 MLJ 1 and Majavath Alt V/s. Mujafaralli do not refer to this distinction. I therefore think that the plaintiff's suit is not barred by limitation under Art. 134 of the Limitation Act. As it has been admittedly brought within two years after he became a pujari his suit is within time.

(3.) I therefore set aside the decree of the Courts below and give the plaintiff a decree as prayed for subject to his giving defendants 3 to 5 Rs. 1,700 for the value of improvements effected by them. The plaintiff will have his costs in all the Courts.