ARJEE PRABAPPA CHETTI Vs. KONETI DESIKACHARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., ordering execution on an execution application made by the assignee of a decree. Objection was taken to the execution application on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The article applicable to the application in question for execution is Art. 183, because it was in respect of a decrele passed on the Original Side of this Court. Under that Art. the decree-holder has twelve! years not only from the date on which he becomes entitled to enforce the decree but also twelve years from the date on which some part of the principal money secured thereby or some interest on such money has been paid. In this case, we find that M. Sabapathy Chetti, the original decree-holder, died without drawing from the Court the sum of Rs. 24,000 odd ordered to be paid to him by order, dated the 6 October, 1909. Subsequently, the Administrator-General of Madras, I believe, as Administrator- General pendente lite in the administration suit relating to Sabapathy's estate! applied to the Court for the payment to him of the entire sum of Rs. 25,932 standing on that date to the credit of the suit, and Wallis, J. passed an order directing such payment on the 9 January, 1912. The present application for execution is within twelve years from that date and a fortiori is within twelve years from the date on which the payment out was made from the Court.

(2.) It has been sought to be argued by the learned Vakil for the appellant that it was not a proper application by the Administrator-General, because, previous to that application, he had not brought himself on the record in the place of the deceased decree-holder. No such process is contemplated by the procedure laid down either in the Procedure Code or in the rules on the Original Side and all that is necessary is that the person who becomes by operation of law entitled to have execution is required only to make an application for execution.

(3.) It has next been argued that the payment referred to in Art. 183 must have been a payment either by the judgment-debtor himself or by some duly constituted agent or some person acting on his behalf: In Section 20 of the Limitation Act, where a part payment is referred to as giving rise to a further starting of limitation, it is significant that it is prescribed that, for the purpose of saving limitation, the part of the principal of a debt should be paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf, but, in Art. 183, however, there are no such words to be found after the words " some part of the principal money secured thereby or some interest on such money has been paid." The payment is not therefore required to be made either by the debtor or by some person acting on his behalf. The difference in the wording is significant, and, I cannot help thinking, fully intended. It therefore follows that, even if payment is for the judgment-debtor or on his account it would be a payment that will save limitation giving rise to a fresh starting point.