DEBIR-UD-DIN Vs. AMINA BIBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif of Uluberia on the 30 November, 1922, according to the award filed in the suit. Two substantial objections are taken to the decree passed by the lower Court. First, that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in accordance with an award filed after the time fixed by the Court for the filing of it, and, secondly, that the agreement to refer the matter to arbitration was entered into on behalf of a minor plaintiff by his mother without the sanction of the Court. The award, therefore, is not valid in law and should not be enforced.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been taken to the effect that no petition in revision lies against a judgment and decree passed in accordance with an award filed in the suit following the arbitration proceedings under Schedule II to the Civil Procedure Code; and in support of this submission reference has been made to the case of Ghulam Khan V/s. Mahomed Hassan [1902] 29 Cal. 167. There is a great deal of force in the objection, but at the same time, I am not prepared to lay down as a general rule that in no case in which an award has been filed and decree passed in accordance therewith can this Court interfere under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. It is conceivable that there may be cases in which the arbitrators or the Court may have exceeded their jurisdiction or acted with material irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings. But I am of opinion that the present case is covered by the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case referred to.

(3.) With regard to the first ground of the objection, it appears that the matter was referred to the arbitration of certain persons and the 10 November 1922 was fixed for the filing of the award. On that date, the award not having been filed the Court passed the following order. The arbitrators have not submitted their award. Issue Takid at once fixing the 10 November for hearing. The officer who had passed that order was the same officer who passed the decree; and he says that his intention in passing that order was to extend the time to the 10th November for the filing of the award, though he had not said so in so many words. Stress is laid upon the case of Digambari Bewa V/s. Joy Narain Das (1912) 16 C.L.J. 573, and it is contended on the authority of that case that, unless the Court expressly extends the time to file an award, the mere adjournment of the case to a future date cannot be taken to have extended the time. On a close examination of the case it, however, appears that it is an authority for the proposition that an order like the present may be taken as an order for extending the time for filing the award. In that case the final order was for the disposal of the case on the evidence to be produced by the parties before the Court on the adjourned date. The learned Judges held that would not be an extension of time for filing the award. In my opinion, by the order passed by the learned Munsif on 23 October, the Court intended to extend the period for the filing of the award to the 10 November. The award was filed on the 4 November 1922. It thus appears that the award was filed in time and is not invalid on the ground that it was filed out of time.