(1.) In this case it is now common ground that the accused is charged and convicted solely under Secs.41(g) and. 18 (2) of the Indian Factories Act, 1911. Section 41(g) provides for the case where any order of an Inspector (inter alia) under Section 18 is not complied with. Then Section 18(2) runs: If in any factory there is any other part of the machinery or mill gearing which may in the opinion of the Inspector be dangerous if left unfenced, the Inspector may serve on the manager of the factory an order in writing, specifying the measures which he considers necessary for fencing such part in order to remove the danger, and requiring him to carry them out before a specified date.
(2.) Why I lay stress on the particular sections under which the accused is now charged and convicted is, that the original application of February 27, 1924, by the Inspector of Factories, asked for a summons under Section 41(f) for breach of Section 18(3) of the Act. Then the summons that was actually served on the respondent, and which we have seen, is under Section 41(f) for breach of Section 18(2). The summons was clearly wrong because Section 41(f) does not apply to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 at all.
(3.) Then as regards the original application made by the Inspector of factories, Section 18(3) applies to a different matter altogether, viz., that "all fencing must be constantly maintained." But the allegation here is not that the fencing was not maintained, but that it was not put up at all. So that also was a mistake. Similarly to avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to make it perfectly clear that the charge is not under Section 18(1)(c) which provides that "Every part of the machinery and electrical fittings including live wires and switches which the Local Government may by rule require to be kept fenced shall be securely fenced." It is admitted by the Government Pleader that that Sub-section does not apply here.