PHOOL SINGH Vs. MTGOBIND KOER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an unfortunate case on the facts found. The plaintiff was the minor son of one Gitam Singh. During his minority his father granted a perpetual lease of certain agricultural land on terms highly favourable to the lessee and unfavourable to himself. It seems to have been also found by two Courts that undue influence was used by two of the defendants in obtaining this lease from the plaintiff's father. After the death of his father the plaintiff acting through his next friend endeavoured to obtain from the Revenue Court the ejectment of the defendants admitting them to be his tenant but claiming that they had no higher right than those of tenants at will. When this lease was set up the attempt at ejectment in the revenue Court failed.

(2.) The plaintiff then brought the present suit asking for a declaration that the lease is not binding upon him either on the ground that it was obtained by undue influence exercised upon his father or even if that plea should fail on the ground that it amounted under the circumstances to an alienation of joint ancestral family property in the hands of the plaintiff's father, which the latter was not competent by law to make. Two Courts found in favour of the plaintiff on all points and granted him the declaration prayed for.

(3.) There was a second appeal to this Court and in this appeal the first two points taken related to the question whether the land covered by the lease was joint ancestral property and whether there had been a clear finding on the question ofundue influence. On the first point the learned Judge of this Court held that there was a finding of fact in favour of the plaintiff. At any rate the learned Judge found definitely that the property in dispute was ancestral property belonging jointly to the plaintiff and his father. On the second point the learned Judge of this Court held that the finding of the lower appellate Court to the effect that the terms to the lease were clearly prejudicial to the plaintiff's interests was sufficient, in itself to make the contract of lease, voidable at the plaintiff's instance.