GANPAT LAL Vs. EMPEROR THROUGH KAUSILA PRASAD PANDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision in a case in which the learned Sessions Judge acting under the provisions of Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, has set aside an order of discharge passed under Section 209 and directed the commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. The case was one under Section 218 of the Indian Penal Code, triable exclusively by the Court of Session, in which a patwari was accused of intentionally framing an incorrect recoijl with a view to cause injury to the complainant. The Magistrate who heard the case came to the conclusion that on the evidence before him there was absolutely no material on which he could hold that the patwari intentionally prepared a wrong record or that he did so with the intention of injuring the complainant. He was indeed so strongly satisfied that the prosecution was without foundation thai he directed proceedings to he taken against the complainant under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Holding this view he discharged the accused as he was bound to do under the provisiens of Section 209. That section lays down that if the Magistrate finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial he shall record his reasons and discharge him. The learned Sessions Judge has set aside this order on the ground, to quote his own words, that There have been several rulings to the effect that, such cases if made out prima facie, should be committed to the Sessions Court and not discharged by a Magistrate.

(2.) As the nowhere said that the reasons given by the Magistrate for discharging the accused are insufficient I understand his view to be that if the prosecution makes statements which if accepted at their face value might make out a case against the accused he is bound to commit hirn to Sessions even though he is satisfied that no grounds for so doing exist and that the charge is a baseless one. If this is the learned Sessions Judge's view it is entirely erroneous. It is true that there are one or two old cases e.g., Chiranji Lal V/s. Ram Lal A.W.N. (1904) 5 : 1 Cr. L.J. 56 in which this proposition has been laid down but it has been dissented, from in a long series of cases of which I. may instance Fate V/s. Fattu 26 A. 564; A.W.N. (1904) 125 : 1 A.L.J. 292 : 1 Cr. L.J. 510, Shahzad, V/s. Emperor 20 Ind. Cas. 717 : 12 A.L.J. 150 : 14 Cr. L.J. 491, Dharam Singh V/s. Joli Prasad 28 Ind. Cas. 1005 : 37 A. 355 : 13 A.L.J. 497 : 16 Cr. L.J. 429 and Muhammad Abdul Hadi Vs. Baldeo Sahai 63 Ind. Cas. 831 : 1. 9 A.L.J. 831 : 2 U.P.L.R. (A.) 184 : 22 Cr. L.J. 703. It is now settled law that if a Magistrate is satisfied that the charge is without foundation and that there are no sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial he is entitled, and indeed it is his duty, to discharge him.

(3.) For the above reasons I accept this application and set aside the order of the Court below.