F D BELLEW Vs. TELKE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this Rule we are asked to revise the order of the Rent Controller, dated the 6 July, 1923, in Standard Rent Case No. 673 of 1922 dismissing the application of the petitioner under Section 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act, III of 1920. The facts are that the petitioner was a tenant under the opposite party in respect of premises No. 24, Royd Street, for six months from the 5 August, 1922. On the 31 of October, 1922, the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller to have the standard rent fixed. The case was adjourned from time to time and it took 8 months to come to a hearing. On the 30 June, 1923, the petitioner was evicted under a decree of the Calcutta Small Cause Court. That decree was passed on the 14 May, 1923 on the ground that the tenant had not paid rent and was an insolvent. On the 6 July, 1923, the petitioner's application under the Rent Act was dismissed. The ground upon which the application has been dismissed is that the petitioner having ceased to be a tenant in respect of the premises for which he had applied for standardization of the rent the case could not go on. No authority has been cited for this view, but the learned Rent Controller has felt himself bound by a certain ruling of the President of the Improvement Trust Tribunal who under the Act has been vested with revisional authority over the Rent Controller.

(2.) Under the Act a tenant is empowered to apply to the Rent Controller to have the standard rent of a premises fixed. It is conceded by the learned vakil for the opposite party that there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the proceedings under it come to a termination as soon as the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has ceased. But it is argued that in consideration of the general scheme of the Act it must be so I am unable to accede to this proposition. I find on a close scrutiny of the Act nothing in it to justify the dropping of a proceeding which has been started regularly under the Act because one of the parties was not at the date of the hearing occupying the position which he did at the commencement of the case. In my opinion, when a case has been regularly started, there must be some direct provision in law to disqualify it from being carried to the end. Reference has been made to certain provisions of the Act, Section 8 has been referred to as indicating, that, when there is an enhancement of rent on the application of the landlord, he cannot recover it until after the expiration of one month after the landlord served on the tenant a notice in writing of his intention to increase the rent, I do not think that this provision lends support to the contention of the landlord. Then reliance has been placed upon Section 14 which provides that when a tenant has overpaid the landlord and then rent is subsequently reduced he may recover the amount from the landlord and may deduct it from any rent payable within six months. It is contended that this indicates that the relationship of landlord and tenant must continue even after the Rent Controller has fixed the rent. It may be so, but that section provides that this is one of the modes of recovering money paid to the landlord more than what was due to him, as it is specially mentioned that this remedy is without prejudice to any other method of recovery. A person who has ceased to be a tenant has under the general law a right to recover any over-payment made to the landlord.

(3.) In support of my view reference may be made to Section 15, Clause (4), which says that before exercising any of the powers conferred upon him by this Act the Controller shall give notice of his intention to the landlord and tenant "if any." The words "if any" indicate that it is possible that when the time comes for the Rent Controller to give notice of his intention under the Act one of the parties may have ceased to be either a landlord or a tenant. It is also argued on behalf of the opposite party that the application before the Rent Controller was not maintainable inasmuch as the new tenant who was brought on the premises after the petitioner had left it, ought to have been made a party because any decision in this case will be binding upon him. I do not see much force in this contention. The Act does not make it obligatory upon the applicant for standardization of rent to make all persons interested in the litigation parties to the proceeding except the landlord; and this view finds support from Section 15, Clause (4) of the Act which provides that the Rent Controller shall duly consider any application received by him from any person interested. The new tenant, if he so chooses, may make an application to the Rent Controller to be heard at the time of the hearing of this case. I may also refer in this connection to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides against the dismissal of a case for want of proper parties.