(1.) THE only point of law raised is that the decision of the district Judge is based on inadmissible evidence, viz., Exhibits B, C, and D. THEse are deeds of sale and mortgage executed by plaintiff s witnesses Nos. 2 and 3 in which the suit land is referred to as "Gunman s Nanja" or "Pappanaicken s Nanja"--Pappanaicken being the plaintiff and Guruvan his father. THE witnesses have deposed to the possession (not the title) of the plaintiff and his father in the suit land, and these documents have been admitted under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act as corroborative of their evidence. Possession (as distinguished from title) is a "fact" within the definition of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, and we are unable to agree with the contention of the appellant s Vakil that the word "fact" in Section 157 is used only in the limited sense of "event," and does not include a continuing fact, such as possession, which is embraced by the definition.
(2.) IN our opinion the documents were admissible as evidence. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.