SARIPAKA CHINA MAHADEVA VAZULU Vs. MUTHURA SURYAPRAKASAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Plaintiffs are appellants. In the plaint they state that they are entitled to the hereditary purohitship of all the villages in the Chemudu Zamindari and that they alone are entitled to officiate as purohits at the ceremonies performed by the Chemudu Zamindars and also for the people in the villages in the zamindari. They further allege that according to mamool, they employed defendant to perform ceremonies in those villages on his agreeing to pay them Rs. 12 a year and that he has not paid Rs. 12 due for Plavanga (1907-08) and the suit was brought to recover that amount.

(2.) The lower appellate Court found that there was no contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant for the year Plavanga and that therefore the suit ought to be dismissed. I do not wish to base my judgment upon this finding of fact as I am strongly against the recognition of an office which could give rise to an exclusive right to officiate as purohit for a particular person or in a particular village or villages, especially, a right which can be enforced in courts of law. I adopt the arguments of the learned Advocate General as reported at page 63 in Valeswara Aiyar v. Muthukrishna Aiyar and I hold that a monopoly to officiate as purohit should not be recognised by Courts and that it is against public policy to allow any such claim. One of the lawful occupations of a Brahmana is officiating as priest for others and receiving whatever is freely and voluntarily given after such priestly office is performed. But there is no authority in the Shastras for the view that the occupation carries with it the right to put the duties on the shoulders of a third person while receiving a portion of the remuneration given for the performance of the duties. That a custom to claim a monopoly to pursue an occupation which is reasonable at one time may become unreasonable at another time has also been suggested by Lord Macnaghten in the course of the arguments before the Privy Council in the case in Sadagopachariar v. A. Rama Rao (1907) 11 C.W.N. 585 at p. 590. I.L.R. 30 M. 30 185 P.C : 17 M.L.J. 240. The right to exclude other people from following a legitimate calling or profession (the calling of purohitship being open to all Brahmins) cannot be countenanced by courts. There can be no individual property in any such common calling, though, of course the following of that calling by the paintiff as an individual can give rise to rights in him as against those who have entered into contracts and obtained benefits from the exercise of that calling by the plaintiff.

(3.) The plaintiffs in this case not only claim the office but they claim it as an hereditary office. In S.A. Nos. 1470 and 1471 of 1911, I have ventured to state that a claim to succeed by hereditary right to any office, especially to an office involving spiritual minsitrations, should be looked upon with strong disfavour by courts. I also hold that it is contrary to the Hindu Sastras to recognise any such hereditary right, in a spiritual office, the right to hold such on office depending on the requisite spiritual qualifications. In Dwarakunath Misser v. Rampertab Misser (1911) 13 Cal. L.J. p. 449. (at p.451 to 453) Mr. Justice Mookerjee has advanced cogent arguments for the position that though when an office is attached to an idol or some other image of the deity, it may be recognised by court as an exclusive right to perform religious ceremonies for pilgrims or to officiate as priests for pilgrims or other ill-defined class of persons cannot be recognised by courts so as to entitle the plaintiffs, (the alleged holders of that right) to maintain suits for the voluntary offerings which are given by those who obtain spiritual ministrations at certain theerthams or places. The cases quoted by the appellants learned vakil namely, Bheemacharyalu v. Ramanujacharyulu (1907) 17 M.L.J. 493 Bashiakar v. Thathackariar (1910) 20 M.L.J. 530 and the case in C.R.P. No. 352 of 1909, related to offices attached to a temple or a mosque and those decisions throw no light on the decision of the question now in dispute.