SHIDAPPA BAPU BIRADKAR Vs. NINGANGAUDA SIDDANGAUDA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts out of which this second appeal arises are few and undisputed. One Ramangauda had a son Ningangauda, who died during his lifetime leaving a widow Shidava. Thereafter Ramangauda died leaving a widow Avabai, who inherited the property of her husband. In 1878 Shidava adopted Shidappa with the consent of Avabai in whom the estate was vested at the time as the heir of the last full owner. Shidava died in 1904. Avabai apparently had predeceased Shidava. The present plaintiff who is the adopted son of Shidappa claims to be the owner of the property in suit, while the defendants claim the property as the reversioners of Ramangauda. It is common ground that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed, if the adoption of Shidappa by Shidava is valid. The lower Courts have held the adoption to be valid mainly relying upon the case of Payapa v. Appanna (1898) I.L.K. 23 Bom. 327.

(2.) In the appeal before us, the same question has been raised, and it is argued on behalf of the defendants that the adoption by Shidava is invalid as the adoption is not to the last full owner, and that the consent of Avabai cannot validate it. In other words it is contended that the case of Payapa v. Appatma, which is admittedly on all fours with the present case, is not correctly decided. It is conceded-and I think rightly conceded-that there is no decision of this Court or of the Privy Council which is in conflict with Payapa s case. But Mr. Nilkanth has relied upon certain dicta in Shri Dharnidhar V. Chinto (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 250, 258. Ramchandra v. Mulji Nanabhai (1896) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 558., Ramkrishna v. Shamrao (1902) 4 Bom, L. R- 315; I.L.R. 26 Bom. 526. and Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak (1905) 10 Bom. L.R. 692; I.L.R. 32 Bom. 499., as Bhowing that the decision in Payapal s case cannot now be accepted as a binding authority. He has also drawn our attention to the criticism on these cases in paragraphs 194 and 195 of Mayne s Hindu Law (8th Edn. pp. 255-258).

(3.) In dealing with these cases it is necessary to bear in mind the particular facts of each case, and the point for decision with reference to which the observations must be deemed to have been made. It is also necessary to remember that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and that it cannot be quoted for a proposition which may seem to follow logically from it. Viewed in this light it is clear that Payapa s case is an authority for the proposition that a widowed daughter-in-law (I mean the widow of a predeceased son) can make a valid adoption with the contemporaneous consent of her mother-in-law, in whom the estate of the last full owner is vested as an heir. We are not concerned in this case with the exact scope of the general propositions enunciated in the case as third and fourth exceptions to the rule by Ranade J. The observations in the two earlier cases were obiter dicta and considered by the Court which decided Payapa s case. The Full Bench ruling in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao does not touch the point actually decided in Payapa s case. The Full Bench considered the question of the power of the grand-mother to make a valid adoption and held that her power to adopt was at an end, when her son died leaving a grandson as his heir.