M SUBBAYYA Vs. MRACHAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The District Munsif of Madanapalle passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 299 of 1910 on the 30th of March 1911. The contract which gave rise to the litigation was made in Kadiri which was at the time of the suit within the jurisdiction of the Madanapalle District Munsif. The scheme for the redistribution of districts came into force on the 1st of April 1911, by which Kadiri was added to the jurisdiction of the District Munsif of Penukonda. From Madanapalle appeals lie to the District Judge of Cuddapah; from Penukonda to the District Judge of Bellary. The defendant filed the appeal in the District Court of Bellary on the 26th of June 1911 against the decision in Original Suit No. 299 of 1910. The District Judge held that the appeal lay to the Cuddapah District Court, and returned it for presentation accordingly. The District Judge of Cuddapah on the appeal being presented to him came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction. This revision petition is against the said order.

(2.) There is no Madras decision directly bearing on the matter. Section 13 of the Madras Civil Court Act gives no indication regarding the appellate forum; Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that an appeal "shall lie to the Court authorised to hear appeals." The question is whether that Appellate Court is one which had jurisdiction when the suit was decided or at the time when the appeal came to be presented. Two cases relating to execution of decrees in which the question was whether the Court which passed the decree or the Court to which territorial jurisdiction was assigned subsequently should entertain applications came up for consideration before the High Court. In Subbiah Naicker v. Ramanathan Chettiar , the learned Judges were of opinion that loss of territorial jurisdiction ipso facto effected a transfer of venue. This view derives support from the actual order that was made in Alagappa Mudaliyar v. Thiyagaraja Mudaliyar (1910) M.W.N.,477. There are only two cases in the other High Courts. The decision in Allah Dai Begam v. Kesri Mal (1906) I.L.R. 23 All. 93, which is to the effect that appeals lie to the Court to which the territory is added is based on the construction of the language of Section 17 of the North-Western Provinces Civil Courts Act. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Harabati v. Satyabadi Behara (1907) I.L.R. 34 Calc. 636, came to a similar conclusion on the interpretation of the language of the special statute and of the notification of the Government bearing on it. I do not find any direct English decision on the point. But in the American Encyclopaedia, volume II, page 965, it is stated that the "jurisdiction of the cause is not transferred to the appellate tribunal until, under the particular laws prevailing, the appeal is perfected." The above discussion shows that the Legislature in India favours the view that the Original Court should have no jurisdiction when the place where the contract was made is taken away from its limits. The law in America is in consonance with this principle. I must hold on the authorities referred to by me that the appeal lay to the District Court of Bellary. I am aware that the convenience of the litigants will not be advanced by this conclusion. In case the Appellate Court should either remand the case for fresh disposal or ask for a finding upon new issues, it is desirable that the case should go back to the Munsif who heard it originally. If the appeal is heard by the Bellary District Judge in this case, he will have no power to send the case down to the District Munsif of Madanapalle. But in matters of procedure uniformity is of the essence of the administration of justice and as it has been held already that in regard to applications for execution the Court which decided the suit ceases to have jurisdiction by the transfer of territory, the decision in this case should be that the appeal lies to the District Judge of Bellary as Kadiri is part of the Bellary district.

(3.) The appeal will be sent to that Court to be disposed of according to law.