LAWS(PVC)-1914-11-8

SRINIVASA RANGA RAO PANTULU, BY THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE, HIGH COURT Vs. RAJA KUMARA VENKATA PERUMAL RAJU BAHADUR, VARU, MINOR RAJAH OF KARVETNAGAR, GUARDIAN MRWAVARADACHARIAR

Decided On November 24, 1914
SRINIVASA RANGA RAO PANTULU, BY THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE, HIGH COURT Appellant
V/S
RAJA KUMARA VENKATA PERUMAL RAJU BAHADUR, VARU, MINOR RAJAH OF KARVETNAGAR, GUARDIAN MRWAVARADACHARIAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother is about to deliver and I agree with him that the learned Judge s dismissal of the appeal cannot be supported on its merits and that the order he should have passed under Rule 75 of the Appellate Side Rules was to direct the posting of the appeal before a Bench of two Judges for disposal or orders under Order 41, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2.) But when the learned Judge took the mistaken course of himself dismissing the appeal, the appellant did not at once appeal against that dismissal and obtain the decision of a Bench under the Letters Patent, but chose instead to apply under Order 41, Rule 19. Then the learned Judge could consider only whether it was proved that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the necessary deposit, and, as he did not find sufficient cause established, he could only dismiss the application. We also, dealing with an appeal against his order, are in my opinion confined to the grounds of decision open to him, and have no jurisdiction to consider others. On these grounds the Letters Patent appeal is unsustainable.

(3.) We ought not in my opinion in this case to treat an appeal from one order passed on one date, as we are asked to do, as from another order passed on an earlier date, on the ground either that the appellant s mistake is merely formal or is pardo-nable. For it is not a matter of form to consider a ground of appeal, which is inadmissible in the appeal actually preferred or to. deprive the respondent of the valuable advantage he has obtained in consequence of the appellant s failure to appeal against the earlier order in time. The question whether the appellant s mistake is pardonable can be considered with reference to Section 14 or any other provision of the Limitation Act, when an appeal against the earlier order is filed. It would be premature to deal with it at present.