(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs claim possession of certain lands on the basis of a cowle, Exhibit B, granted to them or to their pre-decessor-in-title--whom. I shall include in the term "plaintiffs"--on the 1.6th July, 1883, by one P. Venkatappayya who was then owner of the land. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants contend that they are entitled to continue in possession of the land.
(2.) The first contention of the defendants before us was that the cowle, Exhibit B, was in fact benami, that the person who, in accordance with the true intent and purpose of Exhibit B, had in fact the right to the possession of the lands was Chinna Subbayya, the father of 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants, and that after him the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants were so entitled. That contention has not found favour with the lower Court : and on the evidence adduced before us, it seems to me to be impossible to come to any other conclusion. For it is admitted that the defendants (in which term I include the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants and their pre- decessor-in-title, Chinna Subbayya, their father) have been paying rent at the rate of Rs. 30 to the plaintiffs. It was contended before us that the Rs. 30 that has been so paid should not be taken as payment of rent. It is difficult to understand how else this sum was paid to the plaintiffs : and I have no hesitation in coming to the same conclusion as the learned Judge, namely, that the sum of Rs. 30 was in fact paid as rent and in accordance with the terms agreed upon between the plaintiffs and the defendants when the plaintiffs became entitled to possession of the property, and that the cowle, Exhibit B, was not a benami transaction.
(3.) Another ground, upon which the appellants rely before us in that assuming that the plaintiffs had any right to eject the defendants, that right is barred by limitation. For it is contended that the right to eject the defendants arose, if at all, when Exhibit B was executed, that was about 30 years ago : and it not having been exercised till now it is argued that the suit for ejection is barred. But the right to eject on the facts alleged and proved by the plaintiffs arose only when the defendants claimed to be in possession of the land without the permission of the plaintiffs, The plaintiffs say (and, an I have said, in my opinion, that allegation was rightly considered to be proved by the lower Courts) that the defendants have been in possession of the land with the permission of the plaintiffs as their tenants and that until quite recently, the defendants have been paying to the plaintiffs rent for being permitted to be so in possession. The suit was, therefore, in my opinion, rightly held not to be barred.