A THIRUVENGADATHA AIYANGAR Vs. RPONNAPA AIYANGAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit by one of five trustees of a temple against the members of the temple committee and the other four trustees, the relief asked for being a declaration that two of the trustees have not been appointed lawfully by the temple committee. The Temporary Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin in whose Court the suit was filed dismissed the suit. The District Judge of Tinnevelly on appeal set aside the decree of the lower Court and granted a declaration that the appointment of the trustees by the temple committee was not legally valid, ordered the cancellation of the appointments and issued an injunction restraining the newly appointed trustees from interfering with the management of the temple.

(2.) It is argued before us that the appointment was valid and that the District Judge has misapprehended the powers of a temple committee and wrongly thrown the burden on them of justifying the appointment. For the respondents it was contended, first that the appointment of the two trustees was in addition to the constituted number and thereby amounted to an alteration of the scheme which, it was argued, was entirely beyond the power of the temple committee; and secondly, that even if the committee had power to make the appointment it lay on them to justify it and that the District Judge having found that it was not justified, this Court could not interfere in second appeal.

(3.) We can dispose of the first point very shortly. There is nothing in the plaint to indicate that objection was taken oh the ground that the appointment was a variation of the scheme nor was the view ever urged during the course of the protracted proceedings in both the Courts; nor does the District Judge base his judgment on that ground. Further it appears that there is no record of any scheme ever having been settled and it is clear on the evidence, the admissions of the plaintiff and the findings of the Original Court that at one time there were actually five trustees, the number now constituted by the present appointments and that at the time of the plaintiff s own appointment there were actually four. This objection therefore fails on two grounds and the appointment could very fairly be justified as one filling up two vacancies which had improperly been allowed to exist for a considerable time. If these appointments are to be viewed as the filling up of vacancies they are clearly justified under the provisions of Regulation VII of 1817 as applied by the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863. The temple in question was, at the date of the passing of Act XX of 1863 one covered by the language of Section 3 of that Act, and, by Section 7 of the Act, a temple committee was constituted to exercise the powers of the Board of Revenue and the local agents vested in them by the Regulation. Turning to Regulation VII of 1817, it is clear that, under Sections 12 & 13, the Board of Revenue had power to appoint suitable persons as trustees and to fill up vacancies from time to time. We are of opinion, however, that even if these were not vacancies, the temple committee had power to appoint these trustees if they thought it advisable to do so in the interests of the endowment, the appointments, as we have already pointed out, not being a variation of an existing scheme. Reliance is placed by the Respondents on Venkatachella Pillai v. The Taluq Board Ssidapet (1910) I.L.R. 34 M. 375 and it is argued that that case is an authority for the proposition that the only powers of appointments recognised by the Regulation are appointments to fill vacancies. That is, however, not the ratio decidendi of the case. What was done in that case was that a trustee namely, the Taluq Board, had been appointed without the existing trustee being dismissed, and the Court held (vide page 335) that the Board of Revenue could not ignore the rights of existing trustees and appoint trustees to the prejudice of one who is in possession of the office under the instrument creating the trust. The duty of the Board was, first, to dis-miss the trustee which could be done for good cause shown and, then, there being a vacancy, to exercise the powers under Sections 12 & 13 of filling up the vacancy. That case, therefore, stands on an entirely different footing to the present. But it is to be noted that the power to dismiss a trustee was assumed to exist by virtue of Section 2 although no specific power to that effect is to be found in the words of the Regulation. This was on the authority of Chinna Ranga Aiyangar v. Subbaraya Mudali (1867) 3 M.H.C.R. 334 a case quoted with approval in Seshadri Aiyangar v. Nataraja Aiyar (1897) I.L.R. 21 M. 179 (vide page 199). Further, the Court points out that on the occasion of a vacancy various powers are given to the Board by Section 13 in that they need not fill up the vacancy but may make such other provision for the trust management or superintendence as may to them seem right and fit. Reliance was also placed on Nilayathakshi Ammal v. The Taluq Board of Mayaveram for the proposition that there was no power in the Board to appoint trustees except on the occasion of a vacancy. It is true that the Court in that case does doubt whether this power can be found in the Regulation other than in Section 13; but the Judges express no decided opinion on the point which was not necessary for the decision of the case. What was decided there was that where the Taluq Board had taken over the management by virtue of Section 51 of the Local Boards Act it could not divest itself of its duty of managemant by appointing an independent trustee.