GIRRAJ SINGH Vs. RAM SINGH AND HIMANCHAL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that a certain lease and kabuliat were not binding upon him on the ground that they had been granted by a karinda who had no authority. The material facts are as follows : The plaintiff sued in the first instance in the Revenue Court to eject the defendant appellant. The allegation was that the defendant was a non-occupancy tenant from year to year. The defendant set up the lease and kabuliat. The plaintiff replied that the lease was given without authority. The Revenue Court went into the matter and decided that there was authority to create the tenancy and accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted the present suit, claiming the relief we have already mentioned. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the present suit could not have been brought in the Revenue Court and that therefore the matter cannot be said to be res judicata. On the other hand, the defendant relies on Sections 95 and 167 of the Tenancy Act, II of 1901. Section 95 provides that a suit can be brought either by the tenant or the landholder for a declaration of various matters connected with the tenancy, and, amongst others, for a declaration as to the "class" to which the tenant belongs. Section 167 is as follows : "All suits and applications of the nature specified in the fourth schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Court, and, except in the way of appeal as hereinafter provided, no court other than a Revenue Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which any such suit or application might be brought or made."

(2.) The defendant contends that the plaintiff might have sued under the provisions of Section 95 for a declaration that defendant was a non-occupancy tenant and that in such a suit it would have been competent for the Revenue Court to have taken into consideration the question of validity or invalidity of the lease. The defendant further contends that the real "dispute" between the plaintiff and the defendant was whether or not the defendant was liable to be ejected from his holding on the ground that he was a tenant from year to year, and this is one of the suits or matters referred to in Section 167.

(3.) It is necessary for a moment to consider what is the real relief which the plaintiffs seek. It is clear that what they want is to eject the defendant from his holding. The declaration of the Civil Court on the question of the validity or invalidity of the lease would be quite useless except for the purpose of obtaining possession of the holding from the defendant. It is quite true that if we regard the form of the suit and disregard the substance of the dispute between the parties, the present suit is not a suit which could have been instituted in the Revenue Court. But the real substance of the matter is clearly a matter which would have been, and was decided in the Revenue Court. It cannot be denied for one moment that the present suit is an attempt to get behind the decision of the Revenue Court. We think that the real test of the] matter is whether or not the Revenue Court in a suit for ejectment was competent to go into the question of the validity or invalidity of the lease. We can see no reason whatever why it should not do so. If the lease was granted by a person who had no authority to make it, it was simply a piece of waste paper and had no more validity than if it had been forged. In our opinion it is impossible to argue that Revenue Court in the proceedings before it was not entitled to go into the question of the validity or invalidity of the lease.