SASI BHUSAN DEY Vs. UMAKANTO DEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent for the years 1312 to 1315 (B. S.) on the basis of a contract of. tenancy dated the 7th May 1877, under which the rent is payable partly in cash and partly in kind. The tenant undertook to pay Rs. 9 in cash and to deliver a specified quantity of paddy. The plaintiffs allege that rent has not been paid and seek to recover the cash rent as also the value of the paddy at the market rate thereof! The defendants resist the claim Substantially on two grounds namely, first, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the market-value of the paddy but only to Rs. 39 annually as stated in the contract of tenancy; and, secondly, that the claim was barred in respect of the years 1312 to 1314, inasmuch as the suit had been instituted on the 14th April 1909, more than six months after a deposit had been made in Court on the 20th March 1908 under Section 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Courts below have given effect to these contentions of the defendants. On the present appeal, two points have been urged on behalf of the plaintiffs, namely, first, that they were entitled to the price of the paddy according to the market rate, and secondly, that the suit is not barred by limitation tinder Schedule III, Article 2, Clause (a), of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

(2.) As regards the first point, the terms of the contract make it plain that there is no foundation for the contention of the appellants. The tenants agreed to pay Its. 9 in cash and to deliver a specified quantity of paddy. The contract then provided that if the tenants did not deliver the paddy, they should, year by year, according to the instalments" specified, pay Rs. 39 as the value of the paddy; in a subsequent part of the document it was stated that the tenants would pay Rs. 48 in all to the landlord namely, Rs. 9 in cash and Rs. 39 in lieu of the paddy, if it remained undelivered. It is plain that the parties contracted that if the paddy remained undelivered, " the tenants" would be liable to pay to the landlords a fixed sum of Rs. 39 as its value. "Reference has been made to judicial decisions on this point, but the rights of the parties must clearly be determined upon the terms of the contract, and oral evidence is plainly not admissible to show that the parties really intended to enter into a contract different from what has been embodied in the instrument before us. The decisions to which reference has been made were all reviewed in the case of Afar alias Godai Moral v. Surja Kumar Ghosh 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 12 C.L.J. 649 : 15 C.W.N. 249 and that decision clearly is of no assistance to the appellants. The first point consequently fails.

(3.) As regards the second point, it has not been disputed that on the 20th March 1908 the tenants deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 249-10 under section" 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, on the allegation that that was the full amount of money then due by them to the landlords. After this deposit had been made, a receipt was granted to them as provided in Sub-section (1), Section 62, and a notice was also served upon the landlords on the 2nd June 1908. The suit was not commenced till the 14th April 1909. The plaintiffs contend that as the amount of money deposited was less than the full amount of money actually due at the time, there was no valid deposit under Section "6.1, and that, consequently, the period of limitation prescribed in Schedule III, Article 2. clause(a), does not govern the case before us. In supporting this view, reliance has been placed upon the case of Sati Prasad Garga v. Manmatha Nath Kar 18 Ind. Cas. 442 : 18 C.W.N. 84. On behalf of the respondents, it has been argued that upon a true construction of Section 61, it follows that notwithstanding the fact now established that the amount deposited was less than the full amount actually due, the period of limitation prescribed by Schedule III, Article 2, Clause (a), is applicable. In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the observation in the case of Sridhar Roy v. Rameswar Sing 15 C. 166. The question raised is not free from difficulty, due mainly to the obscurity of the language of the legislative provisions on the subject.