SUNDARAMBAL AMMAL AND KAMALAMBAL AMMAL Vs. YOGAVANAGURUKKAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition put in by the plaintiffs, appellants in the Second Appeal No. 1333 of 1912 praying for the passing of a decree in accordance with the terms of a compromise signed by the two plaintiffs and by the 1st defendant. The first defendant though he has signed the compromise petition, opposed the application on the grounds (a) that he was induced to sign the compromise through undue influence exerted on him by the 2nd plaintiffs husband, (6) that the agreement was not the result of a bona fide compromise of doubtful claims but was really a sale of a portion of the 1st defendant s rights for a very low consideration and that the sale was also invalid for want of proper consideration and (c) that the compromise is further illegal as it is really an alienation of a religious office to persons legally incompetent to hold the office (see 17th para of the 1st defendant s affidavit, dated 2nd October 1913.)

(2.) Having considered the affidavits on both sides, I don t think that there is any force in the objections (a) and (6). No doubt it appears that the 1st defendant was in great pecuniary difficulties when he entered into the compromise, having been arrested by a decree-holder for a debt and having even been obliged to put in an insolvent petition. But the fact that a man is obliged to part with his properties for what he considers an unduly low price owing to his pressing necessities, is not a ground for holding that the contract by which he parts with his rights is affected by undue influence. Under Section 16 Clause 2 of the Contract Act; unless the 1st defendant shows, that his mental capacity was temporarily affected by mental distress or that the 2nd plaintiff s husband stood in a fiduciary relation to the 1st defendant or held a real or apparent authority over him, he (the 1st defendant) cannot get rid of the bargain which he entered into by this agreement or compromise petition.

(3.) The really important objection therefore is the third objection namely, that the compromise is in the nature of an alienation of a religious office and is unlawful and that it cannot therefore be accepted by the Court under Order 23, Rule 3, which provides that it is only when a suit is adjusted by a lawful agreement or compromise that the Court can order such a compromise to be recorded and can pass a decree in accordance therewith. There is also another objection, or rather another aspect of the same objection, argued before us namely, that a dispute relating to a religious office cannot be lawfully compromised at all between the parties to the litigation in which the right to the religious office was submitted for the adjudication of the Court. The replies to these contentions by the appellants learned vakil may be summarised thus: (a) the compromise agreement is not in the nature of an alienation of a religious office, but it was a real compromise of a doubtful claim and it merely admits the right of the plaintiffs to a portion of the claim put forward by them in the suit; (b) there is no illegality in compromising the claim to a religious office under litigation, the office being in the nature of a private civil right; (c) even if it is not wholly in the nature of private civil right, still there is no illegality in the compromise of such a claim under litigation.