VENKATACHALLAN CHETTY Vs. ANRMNARAYANAN CHETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first defendant was employed by the plaintiffs, a firm of Nattukottai Chetties of "Devakottah in the Ramnad District to carry on business at certain places in Burmah as their agent under the terms of a document, Exhibit A, known as a salary chit executed by the 1st defendant on his appointment. By this he undertook to carry on the business under the direction on the 1st plaintiff and stipulated that on bringing back the cash and accounts to Devakottah and rendering the same he was to get back the salary chit. It is explained that in the case of these agents the return of the salary chit means that the agent has passed his accounts and that his conduct has been satisfactory. The present suit is brought by the plaintiffs for an account of his dealings, and the question is whether it is barred by limitation. The 1st defendant continued to represent the plaintiffs in Burmah after the expiry of the three years originally agreed upon, and the plaintiffs who were dissatisfied with his conduct had some difficulty in getting rid of him as appears from the correspondence. As early as the 24th November 1906 they wired to him to give the keys, accounts and a power to the 4th defendant who was to succeed him, and at length on the 2nd March 1907, having executed a power of attorney in favour of his successor apparently with a view to facilitate the collection of debts owing to the firm, he handed over charge to his successor, who gave him Exhibit IV, a signed receipt, and a list of outstandings which were stated to have been checked, and also apparently, Exhibits G and G1, certain further particulars signed by his successor, which he subsequently handed over to the plaintiff at Devakottah.

(2.) He then received a sum of Rs. 200 for his travelling expenses and for sweets and other presents to be purchased for the principals. According to the evidence taken in commission for the plaintiffs, Exhibits VIII (a), this sum was not given as a loan, but he could do what he liked with it. It is customary to pay such sums to agents when they are returning. It is not very easy to reconcile this with the earlier statement made by the witness that if any surplus remained it was to be handed over to the principal or an account rendered. On his arrival at Madras, on the 19th March 1907, the 1st defendant wrote Exhibit H and wired Exhibit 1 to the plaintiffs announcing his arrival and stating that he was coming in two days. According to the evidence for the plaintiffs, he came later and handed over Exhibit G and G1 but he never accounted for his agency or got back his salary chit.

(3.) The question then is, whether in these circumstances the suit is barred. It is now well settled that money is moveable property within the meaning of Article 89 of the Limitation Act. That article applies to suits, by a principal against an agent for moveable property received by the latter and not accounted for and time begins to run, "when the account is, during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused, or where no such demand is made, when the agency terminates." The 1st defendant in the present case relies on the termination of the agency. Under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act an agency is terminated among other ways, by the principal revoking his authority, or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency, or by the business of the agency being completed, and it is from this point under article 89 that time is to begin to run in a suit by the principal for money received or not accounted for. Under Section 218 of the Indian Contract Act, the agent is no doubt bound to pay the principal, the sums received on his account, but it cannot be said that until he does so, the agency is not determined because the business of the Agency is not completed, for the terms of article 89 necessarily involve that the agency may be terminated before the payment is made. I am therefore, with great respect, unable to agree with the observations to that effect in Babu Ram v. Ram Dayal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 541 and Fink v. Buldeo Dass (1899) I.L.R. 26 C. 715 which do not seem to have been necessary for the decision as there were other grounds for holding that the agency had not been determined. The better view appears to be that the agency is determined when the agent ceases to represent the principal though his liability in respect of acts done by him as agent may continue.