(1.) This is a suit to set aside an adoption. Two questions arise for decision: (1) whether the alleged adoption of the second defendant is true; and (2) whether the refusal of the plaintiff to give his consent to the adoption invalidated any adoption made by the first defendant as the widow of the deceased Lakshmipatiraju.
(2.) Although the adoptive mother, the first defendant, has, in this suit, taken the part of the plaintiff and denied the factum of the adoption, I have no doubt that the Subordinate Judge was correct in finding that the second defendant was adopted. All the documents produced in the case from 1906 onwards describe him as an adopted son. Exhibit III is a promissory note executed by the first defendant as guardian of her adopted son, the second defendant, which purports to have been attested by the plaintiff. Defendant s witness No. 5 proved the fact that the plaintiff attested this promissory note executed in his (witness s) favour. The plaintiff, in the witness-box, professed himself unable to say whether the signature in Exhibit III was his or not. The first defendant made several statements before the public authorities acknowledging that she had adopted the second defendant, and when her attention was drawn to these statements in her examination, she flatly denied having made the statements. It is unnecessary to refer to the oral evidence, as, in our opinion, there is overwhelming proof that the adoption is true.
(3.) On the second point, the plaintiff is the divided brother of the late Lakshmipatiraju and, as such, is the nearest reversioner entitled to succeed to his properties after his death. He states that he was not asked by the first defendant to give his consent to the adoption of a boy. On the evidence of plaintiff s witness No. 5 and defendant s witness No. 4, I must take it that this denial is not true. Defendant s witness No. 4 states that the plaintiff Was asked to give his son in adoption and that he refused, as the son was his only son. Plaintiff s witness No. 5 states that the reason for the plaintiff s refusing his consent was that be said that he would forfeit the right to property which he would otherwise get. The Subordinate Judge treats this as a refusal based on "an evil intention to usurp the property after the death of the first; defendant." Without using such language to characterise the refusal, we may see whether the refusal was based on improper grounds.