MINAKSHI Vs. MUNIANDI PANIKKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother is about to deliver, and concur in it. I shall therefore merely state shortly the negative reasons, for which I think that the appellant s legal argument must be rejected.

(2.) The case, it seems to me, must be decided on the broad ground that it is for the appellants to show that the illegitimate daughter of a woman, who lived in adultery, inherits her stridhanam, over which she had full power, in preference to her legitimate son : and that they have neither produced any direct precedent for such succession nor established any principle justifying it. As it is not alleged that direct precedent is available, I turn at once to the principles put forward.

(3.) Firstly, the appellants contend for the application of the law of succession applicable to dancing girls to the offspring of a prostitute, such as they allege the 1st appellant s mother to have been. It is not necessary to decide whether she was one, as the appellants, contend; with reference to Annoyyar v. Chinnan (1907) I.L.R. 33 M. 366 and the fact that her immoral life began after her marriage, or was a permanent concubine as the facts suggest. For the argument must fail, even as put forward. On the assumption that she was a prostitute, there is no authority in Madras for applying to her estate the law, which has been recognised as applicable to dancing girls solely in virtue of the established custom of their caste. Vide Venku v. Mahalinga (1888) I.L.R. 11 M. 393 and Muthu kannu v. Paramasami (1889) I.L.R. 12 M. 214. And I observe here, as in connection with the appellant s other contentions, that there is no reason for a liberal construction, the effect of which would be to disappoint expectations founded on legitimacy. It was then contended that references to daughters in the Mitakshara should be read as including all daughters, both legitimate and illegitimate, and that all alike should be preferred to the legitimate son, as heirs to their mother. But, firstly, that is not the primary sense of those references and is unauthorised by the rules of interpretation recognised by both English and Hindu Law. Vide Bhimacharya v. Ramacharya (1889) I.L.R. 12 M. 214. And next it has not been shown how such a substitution can be carried out or logically limited. Should it, for instance, be extended to the law relating to the daughter s right to inherit from the father in spite of the absence of any special provision in her favor,. such as is available in the case of illegitimate sons ?