KIRON CHANDRA BOSE Vs. KALIDAS CHATTERJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This rule is directed against an order made by the District Judge of Rangpur under Para. 12, Bengal House Rent Control Order of 1942. The petitioner's case is that he is a permanent resident of the town of Mymensingh and owing to war exigencies had to evacuate with his family to Rangpur during the summar months of 1942. He hired a house at Rangpur belonging to the opposite party at a rental of Rs. 44 per month. The petitioner states that the house was in a bad state of repairs and he was not allowed to use one of its rooms which was packed with things belonging to the owner; and although in normal times the house could not fetch more than Rs. 20 a month as rent, the opposite party with a view to make unreasonable profits compelled him to agree to pay Rupees 44 a month. The petitioner filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Rangpur who is a Rent Controller appointed by Government under the House Rent Control Order and the latter on inspection of the premises and taking evidence, fixed the rent at Rs. SO per month. This order was made on 30 July 1942. The opposite party thereupon presented a petition of appeal against this order to the District Judge of Rangpur under the provisions of para. 12, House Rent Control Order, Bengal, and the District Judge without issuing any notice to the petitioner or giving him an opportunity to say what he had to say on the matter, modified the order of the Rent Controller and directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 37-8-0 as rent per month in addition to the occupier's share of the municipal tax. It is against this order that the present rule has been obtained.

(2.) The learned advocate appearing for the opposite party has raised a preliminary point and his contention is that the District; Judge exercising powers under para. 12, House Rent Control Order, Bengal, is not a Court and consequently his order could not be revised by us under Section 115, Civil P.C. This is the only point for our consideration in this case, for, it is conceded on behalf of the opposite party that if the order of the District Judge be taken to be a judicial order made by a Court it could not possibly be supported as it was made behind the back of the petitioner and without giving him a hearing. When a Judicial Officer is given the right to determine certain matters of a judicial or quasi-judicial character unconnected with the ordinary jurisdiction which he exercises under law, the question frequently arises, whether in determining such matters he acts as a Court or as persona designata. The authorities on this point cannot be said to be uniform but it seems to be established that when a statute provides that; a particular matter shall be determined by "a Court" and not by an individual Judge, the officer presiding over the Court must be deemed to exercise his jurisdiction as Court and not as persona designata. The case in National Telephone Co. Ltd. V/s. Postmaster- General (1913) 1913 A.C. 546 is the leading English authority on this point. There the question arose as to whether the Railway and Canal Commission which was constituted a Court of record acted as Court or as arbitrators in certain matters. Lord Parker of Waddington said: Where by a statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record without any further provision the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged but all the incidents of jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.

(3.) The identical view was expressed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Balakrishna Udayar V/s. Vasudeba Aiyar ( 17) 4 A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 71. In this case the order challenged was one made under Section 10, Religious Endowments Act, which authorised the civil Court to fill up a vacancy in the temple committee. The words civil Court and Court are g defined in the Act itself, so their Lordships observed, to mean the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district in. which the mosque, temple or religious establishment is situate, and it was pointed out by their Lordships that it is to the civil Court and not to the individual Judge who may preside in or constitute the civil Court that jurisdiction is given. "It appears to their Lordships" so runs the judgment, to be clear that in all these matters the civil Court exercises its powers as a Court of law, not merely as persona designate....