RAM KRISHNA BHATTACHARYA Vs. BADRI NARAYAN CHETLANGIA, THE WARD OF CHETLANGIA WARD S ESTATE THROUGH MANAGER KARTICK PADA GHOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs in a suit which they instituted under Section 34, Public Demands Recovery Act, for cancellation or/and modification of a certificate for the recovery of certain alleged arrears of rent. The suit was dismissed by both the Courts below. The facts were briefly these : One Srikanta Mukherji was the owner of a 1 anna 10 gandas share in a taluk appertaining to tauzi No. 15 of the Nadai Collectorate. In the year 1274 B.S. (1808) he granted a patni in respect of his share in the touzi to one Tarini Prosad Ghose, and both the patta and the kabuliat by which this settlement was created are exhibits in the case, Ex. 1 being the patta and Ex. A the kabuliat. The zemindar's interest was subsequently acquired by one Badrinarayan, whose estate was taken charge of by the Court of Wards. The patnidar's interest was also transferred being purchased by a lady Sm. Santisudha Devi, since deceased. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 are her sons and plaintiffs 5 to 7 are her daughters. It is their case that the property was purchased by their mother with her jautak stridhan, so that on her death it passed to the daughters only, to the exclusion of the sons.

(2.) It appears that under the terms of the patni lease, the patnidar undertook to pay the Government revenue in respect of the touzi direct to the Collector on behalf of the zemindar. The main question which arises in this appeal is whether the sum which was thus payable by the patnidar to the Collector can be regarded as rent. The certificate g which was called in question in this suit was filed under Section 6 on a requisition by the Manager of the Court of Wards as representing the zemindar's estate, and it was filed in respect of the amount which was payable under the terms of the patni lease on account of revenue. The claim included interest alleged to be due on such amount under the patnipatta. The parties, named as the certificate debtors, included both the sons and daughters of Sm. Santisudha Devi. One of them, plaintiff 7, was admittedly a minor at the time, but she was represented in the certificate proceedings by her father as nah tural guardian instead of by her husband who was her legal guardian. Upon these facts the plaintiffs contended, and the contentions were renewed before me in this appeal : (1) that the demand in question was not a public demand within the meaning of the Act, and that consequently the certificate was not a certificate duly filed under the Act; (2) that plaintiffs 1 to 4 were not answerable for the demand at all in so far as they had no interest in the patni; (3) that plaintiff 7 was not properly represented in the proceeding and she could not accordingly be made liable; and (d) that no interest was due in respect of the amount claimed on account of rent.

(3.) I shall take up these points in the order in which they have been stated. As regards the first point, the argument is based on a construction of the patni lease. Section 3(6), Public Demands Recovery Act, defines pub. lie demand to mean any arrears or money mentioned or referred to in Schedule 1 and includes any interest which may by law be chargeable thereon up to the date on which the certificate is signed under Part II. Art. 8 of Schedule 1 provides that in the case of property which is under the charge of or is managed by the Court of Wards on behalf of a private individual, a public demand is an "arrear of rent" or of any demand which is recoverable as "rent." It follows, there, fore, that unless the demand in the present case could be regarded as an arrear of rent, no requisition could be filed under Section 5 of the Act, in respect thereof. The contention on behalf of the appellants is that on a con. struction of the patni lease the amount which the patnidar bound himself to pay direct to the Collector on behalf of the land-lord on account of revenue was revenue and not rent, and in support of this contention reliance is placed upon a number of decisions of this Court and a decision of the Judicial Committee. The learned District Judge, however, was inclined to think that these cases did not apply, but that the matter was governed by some other decisions which he has quoted in his judgment.