BHAVADASAN BHATTATHIRIPAD Vs. AVINHIKKAT MANAKKAL NEELAKANDHAN BHATTATHIRIPAD S CHILDREN KARNAVAN NEELAKANDHAN BHATTATHIRIPAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question is whether the petitioners in their suit for partition and possession of their shares have to ask for the cancellation of decrees passed against the karnavan as such.

(2.) This class of case is not covered by the Full Bench decision in Ramaswami V/s. Rangachari which is now the leading authority on questions of court-fee payable in partition suits. The learned Judges there held that if the plaintiff is eo nomine a party to the decree, then the decree is binding on him unless that decree is cancelled, even though the plaintiff may have been a minor at the time represented by the manager or some other member of the family. If the decree is not against the plaintiff, then nothing more than a declaration is necessary. The distinction between the two classes of cases is, if I may respectfully say so, very clearly put by Venkata-ramana Rao, J., in Vallabhacharyulu V/s. Rangacharyulu . He says: There is a distinction between an obligation imposed on a party by a decree and an obligation imposed on a party by the personal law by which he is governed in pursuance of the decree,

(3.) If he is, e.g., eo nomine a party to the decree, then his obligation arises out of the decree itself, irrespective of any personal law by which he is made liable for the acts of the manager of his family. If, on the other hand, the decree is passed only against the person who happens to be the manager and it is proved in execution or otherwise that the debt is binding on him because it was incurred by the manager for the purposes of the family, then his liability arises out of the fact that the manager is entitled to enter into transactions on behalf of the family, but not directly out of the decree itself. Where the suit is brought against the manager as such, then the decree is one against the family represented by the manager; and it therefore seems to me that each member of the family is as much bound by that decree as if he had been specifically impleaded by name in the suit.