RAMKRISHNA BHAU DAJIBA BHAU Vs. SHRAWAN KISAN PATIL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE main question here is whether the appeal to the lower appellate Court was barred by time. The time allowed by law is 30 days. The appeal was filed on the 76th day--judgment was delivered on 3lst October 1939 and the appeal was filed on 15th January 1940. From this 76 days must be excluded the time requisite for obtaining copies. The copies were applied for on 21st November 1939 and were supplied on 11th January 1940. The appellants are entitled to count as copying time both the day on which the copy was applied for and the day on which it was delivered. Therefore, the time to be deducted under this head is 52 days, or rather that would have been the time had the copies not been stopped for want of funds. The copies were stopped for want of funds on 16th December 1939 and the subsequent advance was paid on 10th January 1940. But though the copying was stopped on 16th December 1939 the appellants were not told of this till 3rd January 1940. According to Hira Bai v. Indrabahadursingh A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 287 the time between 16th December 1939 and 3rd January 1940 should not be deducted because the delay between those dates is the delay of the office and not of the appellants. Therefore, the crucial date on this reckoning is 3rd January 1940. The peroid between 3rd January 1940 and 10th January 1940 is 7 days and the whole crux of the problem centres here. If 7 days are deducted from 52, then the time requisite for obtaining copies is reduced to 45 and that makes the appeal one day beyond time.

(2.) THE appellants claim that they should get the benefit not only of 3rd January 1940, the day on which they were informed about the want of funds, but also of 10th January 1940 the day on which they paid the further advance. In my opinion, they are only entitled to the benefit of the first of these two days, namely the day on which they were asked for a further advance. My reasons are these. In the first place, it is accepted that the day on which the copies are applied for and the day on which they are delivered are both to be excluded. Why? Because the law takes no account of the fractions of a day. In some cases a copy is delivered the moment the office opens at 10 or 11 in the morning and the appeal is filed the same day. But in other cases, instead of the copy being delivered the first thing it is delivered the last and that gives the appellant no chance of filing the appeal on the same day however diligent he may be. The law ignores all these possibilities. It does not compel the appellant to file the appeal on the same day nor does it require the Courts to determine the exact moment the copy is delivered. Instead it takes no account of the fractions of a day and gives the appellant the benefit of both days, the day on which he applies and the day on which he receives the copy.