BHOWANI MOHAN JOARDER Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule arises out of an Order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, District Pabna, fining the petitioner the sum of Rupees 10 and sentencing him in default to simple imprisonment for one week under the provisions of Section 480, Criminal P.C. for a contempt of his Court. The facts are briefly that the petitioner, who is a muktear, was arguing a certain matter relating to the forfeiture of a bond when it was pointed out that he had not filed any muktearnama and therefore could not appear. The muktear interrupted and insulted the Court by saying that this would be seen in a higher Court. The Magistrate thereupon drew up proceedings and passed the Order above mentioned. An appeal was lodged before the Sessions Judge of Pabna who held that no appeal lay. The main point pressed before us is that the Order of the learned Sessions Judge is incorrect in holding that no appeal lay. The matter turns on the interpretation to be given to Section 486, Criminal P.C. Clause (1) of this section provides that any person sentenced by any Court under Section 480 may appeal to the Court to which decrees or orders made in such Court are ordinarily appealable. Clause (2) of the section provides that: The provisions of Chap. 31 shall, so far as they are applicable, apply to appeals under this section, and the appellate Court may alter or reverse the finding or reduce or reverse the sentence appealed against.

(2.) The provisions of Section 480 apply to all civil, criminal or revenue Courts and the Code in giving a right of appeal from such varied classes of Courts had to provide to which Courts appeals should lie and this is done in Clause (1) of Section 486. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the effect of Clause (1) is to give absolutely a right of appeal in all cases and that then Clause (2) is to be interpreted as applying only the general provisions of the Code relating to appeals contained in Chap. 31 to such appeals when heard, but that the provisions of Section 413 contained in Chapter 31 which limit appeals in certain cases will not be applicable. The question is whether the terms of Clause (1) are to prevail over those of Clause (2) or vice versa. On the whole, the matter is not free from difficulty but we are of opinion that there is no reason to cut down the plain meaning of the terms of Clause (2) though, the result of failure to do so may in some respects be anomalous. Clause (1) provides for the Courts to which appeals will lie and Clause (2) will apply all the provisions of chap. 31 to those appeals when made; there is no reason to cut out the provisions of Section 413 contained in chap. 31. The Legislature has on this interpretation not made any special provision limiting the right of appeal when the Order under Section 480 is passed, for instance by a District Judge or by any Presidency Magistrate or by other Courts exercising the powers under Section 480, although there is a clear provision in Section 413 limiting the right of appeal where an Order is passed by a Court of Session, District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class, but there seems to be no reason not to give effect to the literal provisions of the section.

(3.) The point raised is one which appears never to have been discussed before in any reported case. There are some cases dealing with the sentence of a fine imposed under Section 480 in which there had been appeals, but in none of them was the present point taken that no appeal lay. In the present case a |sentence of fine of Rs. 10 was imposed by the Sub- divisional Magistrate having first class powers. No appeal lies against such a sentence in view of the,provisions of Section 413 of the Code and the provisions of that section have application to the appeal in view of the provisions of Section 486 (2) of the Code. The result is that the Order of the learned Sessions Judge in this case is in our opinion a correct order. We have been asked, however, to interfere in any case on the merits treating this as a matter of revision from the Order of the Magistrate. In our opinion, there is no reason to suppose that the learned Magistrate was not correct in his view that the remark of the muktear was made with a deliberate intention to insult, and in the circumstances there is nothing excessive in the fine imposed. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere. The result is that the Rule is discharged. Edgley, J.