LAWS(PVC)-1943-11-94

SHRIKISHANLAL Vs. RAMNATH JANKIPRASAD AHIR

Decided On November 22, 1943
Shrikishanlal Appellant
V/S
Ramnath Jankiprasad Ahir Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from the decision of Niyogi J. confirming the decision of the first appellate Court. The predecessor of the appellants leased an orchard held in malik makbuza right to the predecessor' of the respondents in perpetuity at a rent of Rs. 60. The lease provided for ejectment on default of payment of rent. The rent being in default, the plaintiff sued for possession. A decree was given by the trial Court. In the appellate Court all arrears were paid, and the first appellate Court relieved against forfeiture on further payment of interest and costs. Niyogi ,J. held in second appeal that the principles of Section 114, T.P. Act, could be applied to agricultural leases, that the first appellate Court was competent to relieve against forfeiture, and that the discretion of the first appellate Court had not been improperly exercised. In appeal it is contended that the principles enunciated in Section 114, T.P. Act, cannot be applied, that if they are applied the arrears of rent must be deposited in the Court of first instance, and that the discretion of the Court was wrongly exercised.

(2.) AS to the first point, it is argued that Section 38, Tenancy Act, precludes the application of equitable principles. The material part of Section 38 is as follows: Except as otherwise provided for in this Act, a sub-tenant shall hold on such terms as may be agreed upon between him and his landlord. We do not consider that the fact that the incidents of tenancy are governed by contract (prevents a Court of justice from applying equitable principles in regard to its enforcement. It is for example well established that an agricultural tenant is entitled to reasonable notice: vide Nabinchandra v. Rameshchandra and Damodar Prasad v. Lachmi Prasad Singh A.I.R. 1928 Pat. 354. In Vaguran v. Rangayyangar (92) 15 Mad. 125 it was held that a condition in an agricultural lease, to which the Transfer of Property Act did not apply, providing that the landlord might re-enter on non-payment of rent, was penal and would be relieved against, apart from the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In Shri Deo Temple Janki Ramanji v. Ramchand (35) 18 N.L.J. 159 it was held that principles of equity could be applied in matters relating to agricultural leases. In Seth Narayandas v. Krishnarao A.I.R. 1918 Nag. 155 the principles of Section 108(j), T.P. Act, were applied to an agricultural lease, though the appellant seeks to, distinguish this case on the ground that Section 108(j) itself can only apply in the absence of a contract to the contrary. In Ramkrishna v. Eernandez A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 239 it was held that the Court had power to relieve against forfeiture independently of Section 114, and that where the lease did not come within the purview of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court exercising the power which it had possessed even previous to that Act, would relieve against forfeiture for nonpayment of rent on such conditions as might appear equitable on the facts of each particular case, but was not bound by the conditions laid down in Section 114 if the Court granted the relief against forfeiture. In Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 12 it was held that the principles of equity embodied in Section 111(g), T.P. Act, applied to the case, and a distinction was drawn between the power to relieve against stipulations made to secure repayment of money and stipulations made for re-entry on other breaches of covenant, and it was pointed out that the latter stipulations were not considered stipulations by way of penalty. Niyogi J. has reproduced the reasons given in that decision why the sections in the Transfer of Property Act were not made applicable proprio vigor-e to agricultural leases, and has approved the view that in the absence of such reasons there is no ground for applying different rules in the ease of agricultural leases. The case in Ramlal v. Ramchandra cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants is not to the point. That was a case of execution of a decree for arrears of rent by ejectment, obviously governed by the special provisions of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act. Indeed, there is nothing that we can usefully add to the decision of Niyogi J., and we have no doubt that though Section 114, T.P. Act, does not apply in terms to agricultural leases, the Court has power to relieve against forfeiture.

(3.) THESE facts have been clearly analysed by Niyogi J. in his judgment. It is noticeable that on 26th August 1930 the predecessors of the plaintiffs wrote a letter in the following terms: What we have written in our notice dated 27th June of year 1930 are all correct and true. No doubt your client Jankiprasad Ahir has got a patta (deed of lease) in respect of the said land. But that (patta) remained binding so long as he continued complying with the terms laid down therein. And when the conditions thereof were not acted upon, that (patta) was deemed to be cancelled and these proceedings were taken up. No man of Janki came to our place up till 15th June 1930 with jama (rent) nor did he (i.e., Janki) make payment of rent for two years. Then he sent a money order in the end of June 1930. But as he had not paid kists for two years in the month of Aghan and as he had stopped grazing the she but also that is, as he had committed breach of both the conditions, we gave the notice (to him) for ejectment and returned the money order.