GANESHI LAL Vs. SHIAM LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The following question of law has been referred to us for decision. Whether a person claiming the benefit of Section 30, Agriculturists Relief Act, is entitled for the purposes of Section 2(2) (f) of the Act to rely upon the circumstance that he paid no income-tax or that he paid income-tax not exceeding 5 per cent, of his rent for the financial year immediately prior to the suit, or whether/the criterion is whether he was assessed to income-tax for the year in which the loan was advanced or in the year immediately preceding such advance.

(2.) For an appreciation of the point of law which is involved in this reference it is necessary to state a few facts. The appellant sued for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7644 on foot of a promissory note, which was executed on 15 October 1934 by the defendant-respondent for Rs. 6512 with interest at 10 annas per cent. per mensem and which was in novation of an earlier promissory note executed by the respondent on 15 November 1931. The defence set up by the respondent was that he was an agriculturist and was therefore entitled to the benefit of Section 30,U. P. Agriculturists Belief Act. The Court below ascertained from the income-tax authorities that the respondent paid income-tax from the year 1981 upto the year ending 30 April 1985, but that he had not paid income-tax for any of the succeeding years. The suit was instituted by the appellant on 18 September 1937, at which date the appellant was admittedly not assessed to any income-tax. On behalf of the plaintiff appellant, Mr. Malik pleads that before the respondent can claim the benefit of Section 30 of the Act he must show that the loan advanced to him was a loan to an agriculturist. In other words, he must satisfy the Court that he was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act on 15 October 1934; it will not suffice for him to show that he was an agriculturist at the date of suit or at any date other than the date on which the loan was advanced. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Jagdish Sarup contends that the criterion is whether his client was an agriculturist at the date of suit--or perhaps at the date on which the decree was passed. It is a matter of admission that the respondent was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act on the date of suit. Whether he was or was not an agriculturist on the date of the loan will depend on the amount of income-tax to which he was assessed at that date. It is conceded that the respondent was at all material dates "a person ... who pays rent for agricultural land not exceeding Rs. 500 per annum" within the meaning of Section 2(2)(f) of the Act. Proviso 2 to this Sub-section--so far as it is necessary to cite it--reads as follows: Provided also that no person shall be deemed to be an agriculturist if he is assessed to income-tax which ...if he belongs to class (f) above, exceeds 5 per cent, of his rent....

(3.) It is an established fact that the respondent was not assessed to income-tax for any year subsequent to 1984-35 and, that he was so assessed from 1931 up to the year ending 30 April 1935. The controversy before us is as regards the point of time at which the Jaw requires that the debtor should have been an agriculturist. Mr. Jagdish Sarup for the respondent relies inter alia on the fact that the definition and the proviso are in the present tense; but we do not think that this circumstance necessarily leads to the conclusion which he asks us to draw. Where a definition is expressed in the present tense and without any qualification the Court has to look at the Act as a whole and more particularly at the context in which the word occurs in order to ascertain the point of time to which the definition is referable. Mr. Jagdish Sarup on behalf of the respondent invokes the decision of Sulaiman C. J. and Bennet J. in Raj Narain V/s. Bindaban and I may mention that it was largely on account of some uncertainty at the original hearing as to what the learned Judges meant that this reference was made to a Pull Bench. I am now satisfied, however, from a careful examination of that judgment and also of the rule to which the learned Judges refer--which is concerned only with the burden of proof and the method of proof--that all that was decided in that case was the meaning of the words "is assessed" in proviso 2 to Section 2(2) of the Act; the learned Judges did not decide the point of time to which the assessment is referable in any particular case.