EMPEROR Vs. CHARAN DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case has been referred to me under Section 8 (b) of the Ordinance by the special Judge of Saharanpur. The accused Charan Das was charged with an offence under Rule 90 (2) (d), Defence of India Rules, and was sentenced to 18 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 by the special Magistrate. The charge against the accused was that on 10 January 1943 he acquired change worth Rs. 99-1-6 which was in excess of his business requirements. On 18th February 1943 the accused was examined by the Magistrate. It would be convenient to reproduce his statement: Question--Was on 10 January 1943 change worth Rs. 99-1-6 recovered from your house which was in excess of your requirements 1 Answer.--Yes. It was kept for my sister's marriage and to be spent at the time of the birth of child. I had ... (The rest is illegible). Question. -- Have you anything else to say? Answer. -- My wife gave birth to male child on 21 January and marriage of my Bister took place on 14 January 1943. If any offence, I may be pardoned.

(2.) The special Magistrate treated this statement as admission of guilt. I do not think that this interpretation is correct. The statement merely means that coins of the aggregate value of Rs. 99-1-6 were recovered from his possession and the accused offered an explanation for being in possession of the coins. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of prosecution. The Sub-Inspector proved the recovery of coins and in cross-examination stated that he had no knowledge about the marriage of the sister of the accused. Dulli, p. w. 2, states that he was deputed by the Sub-Inspector to go to the shop of the accused and ask for change of one rupee. The accused, according to the witness, refused to supply the change. Witness 3 merely proves the recovery of the coin. The evidence of Dulli is not of much importance, because the accused was charged and convicted of an offence under Sub-clause (d) which runs as follows: Acquire coin of an amount in excess of his personal or business requirements for the time being which in the case of an acquisition of coin from any currency office ...

(3.) In order to prove the charge under the sub-clause the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused had acquired coin in excess of his personal or business requirements. From the judgment of the special Magistrate, it appears that he has not applied his mind to the language of the rule. The accused was convicted and sentenced by him as stated above. An appeal was made to the special Judge. Several points were urged in appeal to show that no case was made out by the prosecution against the accused. Incidentally it was argued that the trial of Charan Das under the Ordinance was illegal. Reliance was placed on G. o. No. 1516-C-X dated 13 February 1943 from the Home Secretary to Government, United Provinces, to all District Magistrates. It appears that the G.O. was received by the District Magistrate of Saharanpur on 15 February 1943 and it was communicated to the Magistrate concerned on 17 February 1943. The case against the accused was tried and disposed of on 18 February 1943. On the strength of this Government order, it has been contended that the special Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the accused under the Ordinance, because the case against him did not arise out of the recent disturbances and was in no way connected with the existing subversive movement. There can be no doubt that this case had no connexion with the recent disturbances. On behalf of the prosecution it is contended that the aforesaid notification did not apply to pending cases. The house of the accused was searched on 10 January and the offending article was recovered from the possession of the accused on that date. The case was sent up for trial to the special Magistrate before the notification was published in the gazette or communicated to the District Magistrate. The cognisance of the case was taken under the Ordinance and there appears no reason why the proceedings should not have continued under the Ordinance. The notification was never intended to have retrospective effect. In my judgment the trial of the case under the Ordinance was not illegal.