YELLA VENKATASUBBAYYA Vs. YELLA VENKATARAMAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises was the first respondent, who is the son of the second respondent. The first respondent sued in the Court of the District Munsiff of Guntur for partition of the family properties and in effect for a declaration that he was not bound by certain alienations made by his father. The plaintiff's father and mother were converted to Christianity on the 2nd December, 1917. Up to then the father and son constituted a joint Hindu family. At the time of the conversion the first respondent was only three years of age. The evidence shows that the father continued to regard himself as being joint with his son. He lived as a Hindu and he married his son and three of his daughters to Hindus, the marriage ceremonies being performed according to Hindu rites. In 1928, he was re-converted to Hinduism. The son did not attain his majority till the 1 July, 1932. On the 10 March, 1930, the second respondent created a mortgage over the properties described in Schedule A to the plaint in favour of one S. Ramaseshayya, the fourth defendant in the suit. Ramaseshayya assigned his mortgage to the firm of Jivaji Zassaji, the fifth defendant. The fifth defendant subsequently assigned the mortgage to the second appellant. In the month of November, 1930, the second respondent obtained a loan from the Pedavadlapudi Co-operative Society. This loan was not repaid and as the result the Society obtained an award which it executed on the 21 January, 1935, by selling the properties described in Schedule A, subject, of course, to the mortgage. The purchaser was the first appellant. The question which the Court has to decide is whether the plaintiff's interests in these properties are affected by the mortgage or the sale.

(2.) The embracing of Christianity by the second respondent effected a division of status. This was the decision of the Privy Council in Abraham V/s. Abraharh (1863) 9 M.I.A. 195.

(3.) For the appellant it has been argued that, notwithstanding that the conversion of the second respondent to Christianity effected a severance, it was open to him to re-unite with his sons. Patanjali Sastri, J., from whose judgment this appeal has been preferred, held that he could not re-unite during the minority of the first respondent. We agree with the learned Judge. Once the family had become divided, it could not become re-united without the consent of the first respondent and during his minority he was not in a position to give his consent.