PEOPLES INSURANCE CO LTD Vs. BENOY BHUSAN BHOWMIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This rule is directed against an appellate order of J. De, Esq., District Judge, Dacca, dated 2l August, 1942, made in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 158 of 1942 by which an order of the Subordinate Judge, Fourth Court, of that place returning a plaint under Order 7, Rule 10, Civil P.C., was reversed. The facts material for our present purposes may be shortly stated as follows: The defendant petitioner is an insurance company having its registered office at 1, Mission Road, Lahore. It has also a branch office at Bangla Bazar in the town of Dacca. One Bidhu Bhusan Bhowmik, who had his native village at Harina in the district of Dacca insured his life with the defendant company for a sum of Rs. 2000 and the company granted a policy bearing No. 10950 dated 2 February, 1937. After paying a certain number of premia Bidhu Bhusan Bhowmik died at his native village on 16 September 1938, and thereafter a suit was instituted by the plaintiffs opposite party, who are the heirs and legal representatives of Bidhu Bhusan Bhowmik in the Court of the Fourth Subordinate Judge at Dacca, being money suit No. 18 of 1941, against the petitioner company for recovery of the money due on the above policy of Bidhu Bhusan Bhowmik. The defendant company who resisted the suit contended inter alia that the Court of the Fourth Subordinate Judge at Dacca had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. This issue on the question of jurisdiction was heard as a preliminary issue by the trial Judge and by his judgment dated 30 May 1942, he came to the conclusion that the suit was triable only at Lahore, as the registered office of the company was situated at that place and no part of the cause of action arose outside it. The result was that the plaint was returned to be presented to the proper Court. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against that order, and the District Judge of Dacca, who heard the appeal, reversed the decision of the trial Judge and held that the suit was entertain-able by the Dacca Court. It is the propriety of this order that has been challenged before of us in this rule.

(2.) Mr. Bose, who appeared in support of the rule, has contended before us that the Dacca Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It has been pointed out, in the first place, that the contract for insurance was completed outside the jurisdiction of the Dacca Court at the registered head office of the company at Lahore where the offer made by the assured was accepted. In the second place, it is said that under the express terms of the contract between the defendant company and the assured the money was payable on the death of the latter at the registered office of the company and nowhere else. The third thing said is that the so- called branch office at Dacca is merely an agency department of the company and its only function is to collect the premia and remit the same to the head office. Mr. Chakrabarty, who appeared for the plaintiffs opposite party has taken up the position that the District Judge was right in holding that as the assured died within the jurisdiction of the Dacca Court, a part of the cause of action relating to the claim of the policy money did arise within the jurisdiction of that Court, which is competent to entertain the suit under the provision of Clause (c) of Section 20, Civil P.C. It is further urged that as the company had a branch office at Dacca the case would come within the purview of Expln. 2 to Section 20, Civil P.C.

(3.) Section 20, Civil P.C., enacts the rule for determining the forum in all personal actions, and under this section a Court would have local jurisdiction to try a suit either, if the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within its territorial limits, or if the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain within the same. The contention of Mr. Bose is that the death of the assured does not constitute any part of the cause of action, upon which a suit for money due on a life insurance policy can be based, and hence the place where the assured died has no relevancy whatsoever in determining the forum of such suit. He relies very strongly upon a decision of the Rangoon High Court, which is to be found in Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Abdul Aziz ( 24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Rang. 2. The other branch of Mr. Bose's contention relating to this point is that when a suit is based upon a contract the cause of action could arise either at the place where the contract was made or where it was to be performed, and it might also arise at the place where in performance of the contract, any money to which the suit relates, was expressly or impliedly payable. His argument is this that the suit cannot be instituted in any other place, and this is clear from Explanation 3 attached to Section 17 of the old Code which corresponds to Section 20 of the present Code. It is true that the explanation has been dropped in the present Code but the law, it is said, remains the same. We have to examine both the branches of this contention. The expression "cause of action" has not been defined in the Civil Procedure Code, but the meaning given to it by Lord Esher in the well-known case in Read V/s. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 at p. 131, is generally adopted by Indian Courts. The passage in Lord Esher's judgment where the expression "cause of action" has been defined runs as follows: It has been defined in Cooke V/s. Gill (1873) 8 C.P. 107 to be this : every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.