LAWS(PVC)-1933-8-97

MANOGI LAL SAH Vs. JOG SAH

Decided On August 31, 1933
MANOGI LAL SAH Appellant
V/S
JOG SAH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of Saran, dismissing an application for execution on the ground of limitation. The decree sought to be executed was pronounced by a Munsif, designated the Additional Munsif of Chapra, on 21 February 1921, There was an appeal from the decree which was unsuccessful and the decree was eventually confirmed by the High Court on 23rd December 1924. The application for execution was made on 19 March 1931, and with reference to the date of the decree, would prima facie be time-barred. The decree-holder, however referred to a previous execution case which was started in the Court of the first Munsif at Chapra, and was dismissed on 14 April 1928. The application out of which the present case arises was within three years from that date.

(2.) The lower Courts have held that the application was time-barred because the previous execution case was dealt with by a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it, as at that time a Court of an Additional Munsif was in existence. This view, in my opinion, is incorrect. The Civil Courts in each district as provided by Section 3, Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887, are: (1) the Court of the District Judge; (2) the Court of the Additional Judge; (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge; and (4) the Court of the Munsif. The Court of an Additional Munsif is a Court of the Munsif. From time to time an extra Munsif is deputed to a district to try such suits as may be made over to him by the District Judge by general or special order.

(3.) The Court of an Additional Munsif who may happen to be sent to a district in a particular year is not necessarily the same Court as the Court of the Additional Munsif deputed to the same area in other years. For the purpose of execution of the decree which the Additional Munsif pronounced his Court was the Court of the first Munsif, for he was then trying suits appertaining to the area which was comprised in the territorial jurisdiction of the latter Court. I consider therefore that the application for execution was made in accordance with law and therefore the subsequent application was not time-barred.