UJAGAR Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Fourteen persons were committed to the Court of Session of Cawnpore charged under Secs.302, 396, 436 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code. Against four of them further charges were under Section 307, I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted no less than eleven but convicted Ujagar, Narain and Bandi Din; the first two under Secs.147 and 436, I.P.C. and the latter under Secs.147, 436, 307 and 302, I.P.C. Ujagar and Narain were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 147, I.P.C., and for ten years rigorous imprisonment under Section 436, I.P.C. Bandi Din was sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment under Sec. 147, I.P.C., ten years rigorous imprisonment under Section 436,. I.P.C., and ten years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307, I.P.C. Under Section 302, I.P.C., he was sentenced to transportation for life; the sentences in all cases to run concurrently.

(2.) On 24 March 1931, the well-known-murderous riots in Cawnpore commenced. After raging there for a few days-the riot and slaughter spread to the surrounding villages. On the 28 and 29 March in the hamlets of Fatehpur. Barhat, Hingupur and Paigupur, some seven miles from Cawnpore, the roits, the subject matter of the charges in this case, took place. The land in those hamlets is alluvial and used as grove-land. All the huts and dwellings of the Musalmans in that neighbourhood: were burnt and nine men, women, and. children were murdered there. A band of 150 to 200 Hindus marched to this district at about 2 O clock in the afternoon on the 28 and to the shouts of "Glory to Mahatma Gandhi" butchered these men, women, and little chilren,. and burnt. their dwellings. We are not concerned whether there was a riot or not; that is admitted. The only question we have to consider is whether Ujagar; Narain and Bandi Din, those persons who have been convicted in. the lower Court and who have appealed to the High Court, are guilty of the: offences with which they were charged. Before we consider the cases of the individual accused we think it necessary to make some preliminary observations: 1. We ruled recently in the Raiya Riot case, Shukul V/s. Emperor , that the evidence of a witness proved to have committed perjury was of no value whatsoever and could not be used for any purpose; that is by itself, or to corroborate, or be corroborated by, truthful evidence. That ruling has been followed by a Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member in Ram Kumar V/s. The Crown and by one of us sitting alone in Man Singh V/s. The Crown . The reasons for that ruling have been sufficiently set out in the judgments in those cases and we do not need to repeat them here. We follow that ruling in this case in considering the value of certain witnesses for the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge in a careful judgment in this case has for excellent reasons found the approver Babu Lal and a witness Madar Baksh guilty of lying. Nevertheless, in accordance with the practice too frequently followed in this country, he has relied on the evidence of both when corroborated. In fact he has gone rather further then is usual, for in the case of Bandi Din he has used the evidence of both these liars to corroborate each other in conjunction with the evidence of another unsatisfactory witness. On this evidence he has convicted Bandi Din. 2. In the case of Narain the learned Judge lays down a rule of law from which we strongly dissent. He says: Evidence which may be good enough to prove a lesser offence may not necessarily reach the high standard which is required for convicting a man on a capital charge and inflicting an irrevocable sentence.

(3.) Narain was charged with murder and arson. There was the same evidence on both charges. The learned Judge on the murder charge, acting on the principle set out above, gives Narain the benefit of his doubt, but not on the arson charge. It cannot be stated too emphatically that there is only one standard of proof for all charges, and that is that the Crown must prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The nature of the sentence cannot affect the question of proof. 3. In communal riot cases we think it unsafe to convict on the evidence of one witness alone, unless there is satisfactory circumstantial evidence in addition. 4. We again call attention to the unsatisfactory nature of the oath administered in Indian Courts to Indian witnesses. It surely is not beyond the resources of the legislature to discover an oath or oaths which Indian witnesses would respect.