EMPEROR Vs. KALLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. In Criminal Case No. 54 of 1932, Mr. Mitchell, Sub-divisional Magistrate, Amarwara, convicted, on their own admissions, Sitaram Gond and his two sons, Kalla and Pachkauri, of an offence Under Section 332, I.P.C., for having assaulted two constables who had gone to fetch Kalla in connexion with an investigation in the case of a house breaking and "in view of their low status, ignorance and poverty" sentenced them "only to a collective fine of Rs. 20." The learned Magistrate further observed: I consider that this lenience is further justified, because they attempted no evasion and merely admitted that they acted as they did in sudden anger, a typical piece of Gond conduct.

(2.) THE learned District Magistrate, Chhindwara, having disagreed with the reasons given by the trying Magistrate for dealing with the accused leniently has reported this case Under Section 438, Criminal P.C., with a recommendation that the sentences were improper and that the accused should have been awarded sentences of rigorous imprisonment. Mr. Pathak, who appeared for the non-applicants, showing cause drew my attention to Empress v. Phagya (1882) 9 CPLR 4 Cr, which was followed by me in Emperor v. Dukhala (1981) 141 IC 861, and contended that the discretion exercised by the trying Magistrate in the award of the sentences in the present case should not be interfered with in revision as they are not so inadequate as to have occasioned a failure of justice. In my opinion this contention is well founded. In Emperor v. Dukhala (1981) 141 IC 861, I have observed that it is evidently erroneous to assume that a sentence can never be adequate unless it is of imprisonment. In the present case on the finding of the trying Magistrate that the accused acted in sudden anger and were poor, the sentence of fine imposed upon them was, in my opinion, not improper or inadequate. I respectfully agree with the observations of Stevens, J.C, in Empress v. Phagya (1882) 9 CPLR 4 Cr, that it should be understood that this Court will not enhance the sentence in any and every case in which an accused person may have been punished too leniently, but only where the punishment appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as to involve failure of justice.